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I. INTRODUCTION
The personal guaranty sometimes seems like the neglected
stepchild of commercial law - ever present, but seldom noticed. It is a
device of overwhelming importance in small business finance and real
estate development, areas that account for well over half of the United
States' economy and an overwhelming proportion of the country's busi-
ness bankruptcy caseload.2 Despite this fact, the literature on guaranties
* Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law (lawmet@hofstra.edu); J.D.,
M.B.A., 1990, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1983, Yale University. I am grateful to Bernie
Jacob, Mark Movsesian, Norm Silber, and Julian Velasco for comments on earlier drafts of this
article, and to Hofstra Law School for financial support for my research and writing. Permission
is hereby granted for copies of this article to be made and used by nonprofit institutions for
educational purposes, provided that the author and University of Miami Law Review are notified
and are identified on each copy. Proper notice of copyright must be affixed to each copy.
1. The Small Business Administration credits small business with employing approximately
54% of the nongovernmental workforce and making more than half of all sales. See UNITED
STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, PUB. No. FS0040, THE FACTS ABOUT SMALL
BUSINESS (1996). Real estate enterprises, excluding construction, employed more than 1.4 million
people in 1995. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNIrrED STATES 511, TABLE 793 (118th ed. 1998). The value of commercial mortgages
outstanding in 1997 was in excess of $800 billion. See id. at 521, TABLE 816.
2. See Hon. Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of
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is tiny compared to that generated in the last few decades on other com-
mercial law topics, like secured transactions, corporate fiduciary duties
or bankruptcy theory.
This is not to say that guaranties have been completely ignored.
Several problems raised by the treatment of guaranties in bankruptcy
have received a great deal of attention. An extraordinary number of
words have been devoted to the Deprizio preference problem,3 and a
substantial number of cases and articles have addressed questions of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction and/or statutory authority to enjoin suits
against third-party guarantors.4 In these discussions, however, the
problems raised by guaranties have almost always been addressed on a
doctrinal or ad hoc basis, without any guiding conceptual framework.
Practically no effort has been devoted to developing a foundation for the
analysis akin to that which has evolved in the secured transactions litera-
ture.5 Little has been done to explain the fundamental role of guaranties
in commercial credit arrangements or their function in the bankruptcy
process - matters logically prior to the specific issues with which the
literature and cases have grappled.
The purpose of this article is to bring commercial guaranties within
the common framework of agency analysis that has been so fruitful in
other areas of commercial law, focusing specifically on one of the most
common and problematic areas of guaranty law, the insider guaranty
(that is, a guaranty from a principal shareholder or manager) in a
closely-held firm. The first two parts of this article attempt to develop a
general framework for thinking about insider guaranties and their role in
small business finance, a theme that is further developed in the final
section of the article, which considers the relationship between insider
guaranties and some fundamental attributes of the U.S. bankruptcy sys-
tem. Part IV shows the value of this framework in thinking through the
policy and legal questions raised by insider guaranties by focusing on
500 Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119 (1996) (reporting that out of 510 Chapter 11 cases on
Judge Fenning's docket in 1991-94, only one was a public company, and 85% reported assets and
liabilities between $100,000 and $10 million); Ed Flynn, Size of Chapter 11 Cases, 12-JAN AM.
BANKR. IN ST. J. 22 (1994) (reporting that nearly two-thirds of all Chapter 11 cases involve less
than $500,000 in assets and only about 10% exceed $2.5 million in liabilities); Douglas G. Baird,
Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & EcON. 633, 636-37 (1993) (stating that two-thirds or
more of Chapter 11 cases are "mom-and-pop" businesses with less than $500,000 in assets; the
majority of the rest are "closely held firms of substantial size"; and only ten to twenty publicly
owned firms file for bankruptcy in a typical year).
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. See infra Part IV.B.
5. The single, and important, exception to this is Avery Weiner Katz, An Economic Analysis
of The Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CH. L. REV. 47 (1999), which lays out a structure for
considering the economic functions of guaranties. Professor Katz's article, while an important
start, does not specifically address the bankruptcy issues considered here.
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two important and contentious areas: the Deprizio doctrine in preference
law,6 and bankruptcy proofing through the use of springing or exploding
guaranties.7
The central thesis of this article is that insider guaranties serve a
critical, salutary and underappreciated function in reducing agency costs.
The insider guaranty is not primarily a means of securing repayment
from the guarantor should the firm default, as it is often viewed. Rather,
it is a bonding device intended to align the interests of the insider with
those of the creditor, thus mitigating the perverse incentives faced by
shareholders as a firm nears insolvency.8 While this fact has been noted
in the past,9 it has never been put in a full theoretical context that recog-
nizes the functions of the guaranty in commercial finance and the bank-
ruptcy system, and so it often seems to be forgotten in crucial policy
debates.
Part I of this article provides a review of the financial agency prob-
lem and common strategies that parties use to ameliorate it. Over the
past several decades, many ad hoc intuitions and judgments in corporate
and commercial law have been harmonized and explained through the
overarching concept of agency costs.1" This insight, dating from the
seminal work of Jensen and Meckling,1" has allowed diverse problems
to be addressed from a common framework. Thus, the scope of fiduci-
ary duties in corporate law is commonly understood as a response to the
agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and con-
trol,I2 and the functions of secured credit or bond covenants are typically
analyzed in terms of the agency problems inherent in the separation of
different classes of ownership interests. 3
The financial agency problem - the divergence between share-
6. See infra Part W.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See, e.g., Andrew J. Nussbaum, Insider Preferences and the Problems of Self-Dealing
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 614 (1990); Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy
Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c), 550(a)(1) and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. LAW. 175,
196 (1985); Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J.
1,6 (1997); Thomas E. Pitts, Jr., Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 343, 354 (1981).
10. "Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts
among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of full
enforcement of contracts exceeds the expected benefits." Eugene F. Fama & Michael E. Jensen,
Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcON. 327, 327 (1983).
11. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
12. See infra Part II.B.1.
13. See infra Part Il.B.2. "Ownership" in this context refers not just to ownership of the
equity interests in a firm, but rather the interests of all parties with claims against the firm. See,
e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
2000]
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holder and creditor interests - grows as a firm nears insolvency. As
this happens, creditors share a series of related concerns that can be
lumped together under the rubric of perverse pre-bankruptcy incentives.
These concerns include the risks of overinvestment and underinvest-
ment, which refer to the incentives for shareholders' 4 to be either too
receptive or too averse to high-risk, high-return investments as a firm
nears bankruptcy. Misappropriation, where shareholders will cause the
firm's assets to be distributed to themselves at the expense of creditors
(through increased dividend payments, for example), is another possibil-
ity. Dissipation is the related concern that equity owners may prefer to
avoid bankruptcy for as long as possible, even if the firm is hemorrhag-
ing money, while dismemberment refers to the risk that creditors will
enforce their remedies against the firm, breaking it up and sacrificing its
going-concern value. These problems are laid out in more detail below,
including a discussion on various legal and contractual devices used to
control these risks, such as fiduciary duties, secured credit, debt cove-
nants and bankruptcy rules.
Part II expands the discussion to include the role of the insider
guaranty in mitigating these agency problems. The insider guaranty is a
commitment from a party in a position to control or influence a firm's
decisionmaking - typically a majority or sole shareholder - to pay a
debt owed by the firm should the firm default. This guaranty serves
several purposes. First, it provides an additional source of assets that the
creditor can reach if the firm defaults. Second, it increases the leverage
that the creditor has over the firm's management should the firm get into
financial trouble. The insider may cause the firm to pay the guarantied
debt, leaving other creditors out in the cold. In some circumstances, an
insider might even agree to allow a viable firm to be liquidated to avoid
personal liability on the guaranty. These possibilities have become the
primary focus of critics, who decry the creditor's ability to use its lever-
age to advantage itself at the potential expense of the firm in general,
and of other creditors in particular.
This is obviously a real concern, but too often it has become the
sole focus of analysis, blocking from view the vital positive functions
served by the leverage inherent in an insider guaranty. The insider guar-
anty curiously inverts some commonly identified methods of resolving
financial agency costs, particularly the acute costs that arise in insol-
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CFH. L. REV. 97, 100 n.15 (1984).
14. While the divergence between shareholder and management interests is a central theme in
corporate law, given the focus of this article on insider guaranties, primarily provided by the major
equity owner in a closely held firm, shareholders and managers are often addressed
interchangeably.
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vency. In recent years, numerous scholars have pointed out that the vio-
lation of absolute priority may be justified as a means of mitigating
these incentive problems.15 Alternatively, scholars have suggested that a
"chameleon equity" or "contingent equity" scheme, in which the
existing equity interests are canceled and creditors automatically become
the equity holders upon insolvency, could provide a contractual solution
to financial distress, and have argued that this contractual solution could
eliminate the need for bankruptcy reorganization provisions such as
Chapter 11.16 Incentive problems can also be ameliorated through the
use of preferred stock, convertible bonds or, to a lesser extent, bond
covenants.
These proposals are generally made in the context of publicly held
companies, and in that setting they make a great deal of sense. As
shown below, however, financial agency problems are handled through
a markedly different device in closely-held firms. The insider guaranty
generally accomplishes the same result as the creation of chameleon
equity in terms of mitigating perverse prebankruptcy incentives, but in
the opposite manner. Rather than turning creditors into equity holders
upon default, it puts the insider-guarantor in the position of a junior
creditor. 17
Further light can be shed on the functions of the insider guaranty by
comparing it with what is perhaps the most studied commercial finance
arrangement, secured credit, a comparison undertaken in Part III.B. As
a doctrinal matter, the two fall on opposite sides of several important
categorical divides: A security interest is a property right, while a guar-
anty is a contract right; A security interest is a right in the borrower's
property, while a guaranty is a right against a third party; The transfer
effected by a security interest takes place upon the recordation of that
interest (typically prepetition), while the transfer effected by a guaranty
takes place only upon its enforcement (typically postpetition). Despite
these difference, the two devices are more alike economically than is
often recognized, and the commonalities raise interesting and important
questions about their relative legal treatment.
Part III concludes with an examination of the implications of
insider guaranties for the functioning of the bankruptcy system with
respect to smaller firms. Although the literature seems never to have
touched on the point, some of the dissatisfaction with small business
bankruptcy may be attributable to the prevalence of insider guaranties,
which can have adverse effects on debtor/creditor negotiations in the
15. See infra Part H.B.3.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 89-94.
17. See infra Part III.A.
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subset of situations that are most likely to end up in bankruptcy
proceedings.
Part IV applies the framework and insights developed in the first
two sections of this article in a number of important contexts, the first
of which is perhaps the most contentious area of bankruptcy law as it
has been applied to insider guaranties. In the Deprizio problem, as it is
known, the issue is whether payments to a creditor, who holds a guar-
anty from an insider, should be considered preferences for the full one-
year preference period for payments "to or for the benefit of" 8 an
"insider," 9 or just for the ordinary ninety-day preference period. This
question generated an extraordinary amount of heat in both professional
and academic circles2" until it was resolved2 by Congress in the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994.22 Building on the analysis presented in Part
III, Part IV argues that this "fix" adopted by Congress can be expected
to worsen problems associated with insider guaranties and also deprive
insider guaranties of some of their inherent value.
Part IV.B. examines a problem that has garnered little judicial
attention to date, but is likely to become a focus of widespread and
heated litigation during the next economic downturn. During the 1990s,
practitioners fastened on the concept of "springing" and "exploding"
guaranties - that is, insider guaranties that take effect only if the bor-
rower files for bankruptcy. These devices have become commonplace,
even though practitioners freely admit they have no idea whether they
will be enforceable.23 To date, there is very little case law and no schol-
arly analysis addressing these instruments, making them a particularly
important area on which to focus before the next recession brings the
18. See I1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1999).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1999).
20. A search of WESTLAW's JLR (Journals and Law Reviews) database as of January 2000
discloses 365 articles that at least mention "Deprizio," and twenty-three separate articles that
expressly refer to the Deprizio case in their titles.
21. For a discussion of issues left unresolved by the 1994 amendments, see generally
Lawrence Ponoroff, Now You See It, Now You Don't: An Unceremonious Encore for Two-
Transfer Thinking in the Analysis of Indirect Preferences, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 203 (1995).
22. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202 (1994).
23. See, e.g., John C. Murray, Exploding and Springing Guarantees, in COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE FINANCING: WHAT BORROWERS NEED TO KNow Now 1999 303, 305 (PLI Real Est. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 0028, 1999) ("The validity and enforceability of
springing and exploding guarantees may be attacked in a bankruptcy proceeding on a number of
theories (which may or may not be successful)."); Sanford A. Weiner, Borrower's Counsel's
Review of the Loan Commitment and Loan Documents, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR
REAL ESTATE LAWYERS 399, 404 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, March 25, 1999) ("To the extent
that it attempts to punish the borrower itself for seeking protection under the Bankruptcy Code,
there are policy arguments why the springing guaranty should be unenforceable.... In addition to
the effect of his/her client, borrower's counsel will need to address the enforceability issue in his/
her opinion letter.").
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issue to a head. As shown below, springing and exploding guaranties
exacerbate financial agency costs, creating a disproportionate incentive
to avoid bankruptcy in a way that ordinary insider guaranties do not.
Moreover, they produce a negotiation problem that renders them even
more troubling than simple bankruptcy waivers (which are generally
held to be unenforceable). For these reasons, I argue that bankruptcy
courts should bar the enforcement of springing and exploding
guaranties.
Finally, Part V offers some concluding thoughts, putting the insider
guaranty into a broader context that draws on Professor Skeel's insights
into the co-evolution of bankruptcy and corporate law regimes." Pri-
vate and public companies handle financial agency costs in markedly
different ways, yet they are generally subject to the same bankruptcy
system. Insider guaranties appear to be a market-generated corrective
aimed at aligning a bankruptcy system designed for public companies,
and ill-adapted to the needs of closely-held firms, to the unique charac-
teristics of these smaller but overwhelmingly numerous entities.
II. FINANCIAL AGENCY COSTS
A. An Overview of Financial Agency Costs
Corporate law and commercial law come together in their attempts
to explain the legal and contractual mechanisms that shareholders, credi-
tors, and managers use to deal with agency problems. Any time a prin-
cipal must delegate authority to an agent, costs must be incurred in
attempting to ensure that the agent faithfully carries out its duties." In
the public corporation, shareholders provide capital, but cannot them-
selves manage the enterprise in which their capital is invested. This
raises the managerial agency problem. That is, shareholders must some-
how ensure that the managers they hire serve the shareholders' interests
rather than their own.26 This problem is generally addressed through
management compensation structures that try to align managerial and
24. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and
Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1325 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, Evolutionary Theory].
25. Jensen and Meckling break agency costs down into three subcategories: monitoring costs,
bonding costs, and the residual loss that is not avoided by these techniques. Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 11, at 308. Monitoring costs are the costs incurred by a principal in attempting to
oversee and control the behavior of her agent. See id. Bonding costs are the costs incurred by the
agent to "guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to
ensure that the principal will be compensated if [the agent] does take such actions." Id. Finally,
because it is impossible to perfectly align the agent's and principal's interests, there are some
remaining agency costs that must always be borne. See id. at 308 n. 9.
26. The problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control in large corporations
was the central theme of a seminal work by Adolfe A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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shareholder interests, and by the fiduciary duties that the board of direc-
tors owes to shareholders. When the corporation turns to creditors for
additional capital, however, a new agency problem arises because the
corporation will be managed for the benefit of the shareholders - at the
creditors' expense, if need be.
The managerial agency problem is generally of limited importance
in closely-held corporations; management can be expected to further
shareholders' interests because management and equity are essentially
identical. However, precisely because management interests are per-
fectly aligned with shareholders', the financial agency problem between
shareholder and creditor interests is intensified.27
One of the central agency costs incurred as a firm approaches insol-
vency is the distortion of investment incentives. As a firm nears insol-
vency, different classes of claimants will have different preferences
regarding the risk/return profile of projects that the firm should under-
take, and the variability of a project's potential returns may become
more important to the parties than the expected return itself. As a result,
an insolvent or struggling firm may pursue inefficient investments.
The first example of this is the "underinvestment" problem - the
resistance of shareholders to profitable investments that have a low vari-
ance. 28 Using an illustration first provided by Franks and Torous, con-
sider a firm with $70 in fixed assets and debt of $100.29 The firm has an
opportunity to earn $50 by investing $35. Obviously, this is a worth-
while investment, having a positive net present value of $15 ($50 - $35).
However, there is no reason for shareholders to bother with the invest-
ment, since the firm's assets will be worth only $85 if the project is
successful. This would enhance the return to creditors, but it still leaves
no value for the shareholders. To generalize, shareholders in an insol-
vent firm may not have adequate incentives to pursue investments that
have a positive net present value, but low variance.3°
27. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 UMKC L. REv. 243, 259-60
(1992) (noting that compensation arrangements that align management interests with equity
holders decrease agency costs while the firm is solvent, but may increase agency costs when the
firm is in financial distress); Susan Rose Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and
Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991) (showing that managerial self-interest may
cause managers in public companies to act in ways closer to creditor interests than shareholder
interest).
28. The classic work on the underinvestment problem is Stewart C. Meyers, Determinants of
Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).
29. See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in
Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 765 (1989).
30. Note that creditors have an equal and opposite set of incentives; thus, creditors may resist
the firm's effort to engage in positive NPV projects where those projects are high in risk. See,
e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1436, 1452
(1997).
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The flip side of this is the "overinvestment" or asset substitution
problem. Any time a firm has issued debt, equity holders have an incen-
tive to increase the riskiness of the firm's investments because the
downside risk is shared with the debt holders. As a firm nears insol-
vency, this incentive to shift the firm from safer to riskier investments
grows. Consider an adaptation of the facts above, in which the firm has
a unique opportunity to make the following investment: The firm can
risk $30 of its assets on a project with a 10% chance of returning $200,
and a 90% chance of returning nothing. Note that this investment has a
net present value of negative $1031; in other words, a value maximizing
firm would reject the opportunity. From the shareholders' perspective,
however, the investment is appealing. If the investment is not made, the
entire value of the firm ($70) will go to the firm's creditors, leaving no
value for the equity holders. If the investment is made, there is a 90%
chance that the creditors will receive $40 and the equity holders will
receive nothing, but a 10% chance that the creditors will be repaid their
full $100 and the equity holders will receive $140.32 This investment
reduces the expected value of the creditors' claims from $70 to $4611,
but it increases the expected value of the equity from $0 to $14.1 4 Thus,
equity holders may be quite happy to have the firm invest in a project
with a negative expected, net present value if the variance in the returns
is high enough."
A related form of misbehavior that must be protected against is
dissipation of the firm's assets through the suboptimal use of bank-
ruptcy. For example, a firm that suffers from ongoing operating losses
may choose not to file for bankruptcy even though bankruptcy would
maximize the firm's value because managers are interested in preserving
their jobs for as long as possible, or in order to extend equity's option in
the hope of a miraculous turnaround.3 6 The opposite problem may exist
as well. If the firm's decision-makers prefer to file for bankruptcy even
when it is not in the firm's best interest (because they benefit from the
31. The investment has an expected payoff of (.10 x $200) + (.90 x $0) = 20, but a cost of
$30, for a net present value of $20 - $30 = -$10.
32. That is, the firm will have a value of $200 from the investment, plus the other $40 of its
initial assets, leaving $140 for equity after the creditors have received their full $100.
33. (90% x $40) + (10% x $100) = $46.
34. (90% x 0) + (10% x 140) = $14.
35. For empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis, see Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T.
Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Approach, 37 J.L. & ECON. 157, 167
(1994); Moshe Kim & Vojislav Maksimovic, Debt and Input Misallocation, 45 J. FIN. 795 (1990).
For a contrary view of the evidence, see Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and
Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 59-63 (1998).
36. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 170 (1989).
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violation of absolute priority in bankruptcy, for example), then there
may be more than the optimal number of filings. In either case, some
system is needed that will tend to get firms into the bankruptcy process
at an optimal time. 7
Another related category of debtor misbehavior is misappropriation
of the firm's assets. Shareholder managers can be expected to use their
positions to attempt to transfer wealth from the firm to themselves as
bankruptcy becomes more likely. This may be done through excess div-
idend distributions, stock buybacks, the repayment of insider debt, or
fraudulent transfers of the firm's assets. This type of misbehavior may
be engaged in for the immediate gains or, more subtly, shareholders may
sometimes choose actions that hurt the firm in order to induce creditors
to renegotiate their rights.38
It is not only the equity holders who may pursue suboptimal strate-
gies in furthering their self-interest. Bankruptcy is often described as a
solution to a "common pool" problem confronting creditors who, in try-
ing to maximize their own recoveries, may destroy the firm's going con-
cern value. Outside of bankruptcy, creditors may enforce their rights
against the debtor, and the first creditor to establish a claim to an asset
belonging to the firm is entitled to be paid out of that asset. Secured
creditors may foreclose on their collateral and apply the proceeds to
their claims. Unsecured creditors may bring suit and then levy on assets,
subject only to prior liens on those assets. The result is a potentially
wasteful "race to the courthouse," as each creditor seeks to beat others to
the firm's limited pool of assets.3 9 Creditors may therefore overinvest in
monitoring the debtor and enforcing their rights; moreover, the race to
secure repayment by levying on the firm's assets may result in the dis-
memberment of the firm, sacrificing any going concern value the firm
may have.40
The contractual relationship between the firm and its creditors must
somehow be designed to minimize the total cost of these various types
of misbehavior, including prevention costs and the costs of losses not
37. See generally Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions And The Creditors' Bargain, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 519 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV.
L. & EcoN. 223 (1991).
38. See generally Yaacov Z. Bergman & Jeffery L. Callen, Opportunistic Underinvestment in
Debt Renegotiation and Capital Structure, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 137 (1991).
39. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860-67 (1982).
40. See id. at 864-65. Moreover, the problem of dismemberment or undue creditor leverage is
particularly acute in the context of small business borrowers who rely heavily on a few financing
relationships - precisely the situation where insider guaranties are most prevalent. See, e.g.,
Jackson & Scott, supra note 36, at 170.
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avoided. The major devices used to accomplish this are summarized in
the next section.
B. Responses to Financial Agency Costs
1. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
One of corporate law's basic tools for controlling agency problems
is the fiduciary duty of management. In its broad outlines, the structure
of fiduciary duties in the corporate setting appears flexible enough to
deal with the divergence of interests between shareholders and creditors.
The directors of a solvent corporation owe their fiduciary duties (duties
of loyalty and of care) to the corporation's shareholders, and owe credi-
tors only the contractual duties that have been agreed to by the parties.
However, as a company approaches insolvency, the directors may come
to owe a fiduciary duty to creditors as well,41 and that duty may shift
entirely to creditors once the firm is insolvent.42 Once a company
becomes a debtor in possession in a bankruptcy reorganization case,
management owes its fiduciary duties to the estate, rather than to any
particular constituency.43
This pattern is commonly explained by considering who holds the
"residual interest" in the firm.n4 In other words, fiduciary duties are
owed to the parties who will benefit or lose from a marginal profit or
lOSS, 45 thereby creating an incentive to make economically efficient
41. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991
LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) ("Where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes
its duty to the corporate enterprise" as a whole, rather than any single group of stakeholders.).
42. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992); Collie
v. Becknell, 762 P.2d 727 (Colo. App. 1988); Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 177 Cal. Rptr. 495
(Cal. App. 4th 1981); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance
Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994); Miramar
Resources, Inc. v. Shultz (In re Shultz), 208 B.R. 723 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); FDIC v. Sea Pines
Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985)
("The fiduciary duty of a trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors."); In re Central Ice
Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (arguing that debtor-in-possession has duty "to
maximize the value of the estate, not of a particular group of claimants").
44. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDozo L. REv. 647, 667-68 (1996); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FiSCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CoRr'ORAa LAW 67-70 (1991); Christopher W. Frost, Running The
Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARiz. L. REV. 89, 114-15
(1992); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23
(1991).
45. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 738, 775 (1988) ("[T]he law of
corporate reorganizations should focus on identifying the residual owner, limiting agency
problems in representing the residual owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control
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decisions. When the firm is solvent (assets exceed liabilities), creditors
will receive their contractually fixed payments, and additional profits or
losses will accrue to the shareholders. Once the firm becomes insolvent
(debts exceed assets), creditors will receive only part of their claims, and
additional profits or losses will increase or decrease the payments to
these creditors. 46 Thus, the directors' fiduciary duties run to the credi-
tors upon insolvency because they become the residual claimants, the
parties who stand to gain or lose based on the decisions made by
management.
If the corporation continued to be run for the benefit of the firm's
shareholders, rather than its creditors, the firm could be expected to
make overly-risky investments.47 If these investments paid off, the firm
would become solvent and shareholders would benefit; if they were
unsuccessful, the loss would reduce the payments to creditors, but share-
holders (who were not going to receive anything anyway) would be no
worse off. Shifting the directors' fiduciary duties to the creditors is a
means of controlling this incentive toward excessive risk.
This simple shift of fiduciary duties, however, is not adequate to
resolve the problem of perverse pre-bankruptcy incentives. While
overly-risky policies present one risk to creditors, there is a symmetrical
problem if creditors are put in control: Shareholders have an incentive to
take on too much risk when a firm is insolvent because they do not bear
the downside, but the creditors may be too risk-averse because they do
not keep the entire upside.48 When creditors of a slightly insolvent firm
consider an investment that would restore solvency, they know that they
would bear any losses, while the lion's share of the gains would go to
shareholders. Directing fiduciary duties to creditors upon insolvency
may alleviate the overinvestment problem, but it brings with it a risk of
underinvestment.49
over the negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring."); Frost, supra note 44, at
135-38 (suggesting that bankruptcy judges should give particular weight to the views of the
residual claimants).
46. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. Rev. 97, 106-109 (1984).
47. See supra Part II.A.
48. For a caveat to this generalization, see Barondes, supra note 35, at 51-59 (arguing that a
lender holding debt with a below market rate of interest may prefer that the near-insolvent
borrower undertake risky strategies, hoping that the debtor will violate its loan covenants).
49. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially
Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1010-11 (1994) (suggesting that
creditors may obtain overly restrictive covenants in debt restructurings, "causing firms to forgo
risky, but profitable, investment opportunities"); Buckley, supra note 27, at 252-56; Laura Lin,
Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1993) (arguing that directors should have a duty to maximize
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Fiduciary duties are not particularly effective at controlling finan-
cial agency costs. As just noted, they only deal with a subset of the
incentive problems that arise on insolvency. Moreover, the justified
reluctance of courts to elevate their judgment of business issues over the
judgment of management leads to the remarkably lenient "business
judgment rule," which renders actions for breach of the duty of care
extremely difficult to win." And the situation is even worse in closely-
held firms, where the equity holders are the primary decision makers. It
is unlikely that the uncertain threat of a future lawsuit for breach of
fiduciary duty will be sufficient to get management to place creditor
interests over their own interests as equity holders. 1 For these reasons,
the vague standards of fiduciary duty law are often supplemented by
specific contractual undertakings, such as bond covenants and collateral,
intended to provide more effective protection for stakeholders' interests.
2. CONTRACTUAL COVENANTS AND SECURED CREDIT
Contractual agreements provide the most obvious mechanism for
mitigating agency costs that arise from the divergent interests of credi-
tors and equity holders. To take the simplest example, bond indentures
almost always include restrictions on the firm's ability to pay dividends,
thereby attempting to stop shareholders of a troubled firm from misap-
propriating its value. Among the most common and important contrac-
tual devices is the provision of collateral.
Over the last two decades, a considerable literature has developed
to explain the functions of secured credit.5 2 Although the story is con-
tested,53 justifications for secured credit generally stress the value of col-
the value of the insolvent firm, rather than the interests of any particular constituency, in order to
solve these twin problems). The possibility that creditors impose overly restrictive controls on
debtors to mitigate the overinvestment problem is the fundamental justification for the power of
the bankruptcy court to authorize post-petition financing that "primes" pre-existing creditors'
claims. See generally George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession
Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993).
50. A prominent corporate law scholar recently summed up the functioning of the business
judgment rule as follows: "The level of care required by the fiduciary standard is low, and the
quality of judgment required is even lower. . . . Except for directors of financial institutions,
claims for such violations have rarely been invoked successfully in the courts." Victor Brudney,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595, 599-600 n.12 (1997).
51. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
25 J.L. & EcON. 327, 332 (1983) (noting that in the closed corporation residual risk holders and
firm decisionmakers are identical).
52. For an excellent recent review, see Symposium, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82
CORNELL L. REV. (1997); see also Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable
Object Versus the Irresistable Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and
Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 2234, 2254-63 (1997) (summarizing the debate over the
efficiency of secured credit).
53. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority
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lateral as a means of allocating the burden of monitoring the debtor to
prevent certain types of misbehavior.14  Secured credit may protect
against overinvestment by limiting the debtor's ability to transfer its col-
lateral and substitute more risky assets. It also may protect against
underinvestment in at least two different ways. First, secured credit pro-
vides the ability to offer a priority payout to shareholders if they agree to
finance a project that they would otherwise reject.56 Second, collateral
provides the creditor with leverage (the threat of foreclosure) should it
detect suboptimal efforts by the debtor. 7 Security may also reduce the
ability of a debtor on the verge of bankruptcy to dissipate the firm's
assets through preferential or fraudulent transfers, by giving the secured
creditor a prior claim to the potentially transferable assets.5 8 Alterna-
tively, it has been suggested that collateral reduces borrowing costs by
reducing the need for monitoring.5 9
Debt covenants serve similar functions by allowing a creditor to
call its obligation if the debtor engages in prohibited strategies.60  The
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CoRNaii. L. REv.
1279 (1977) (arguing that secured credit is inefficient); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured
Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994) (arguing that secured credit redistributes value
from unsecured creditors to secured creditors and their debtors, resulting in inefficient
transactions).
54. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 30, at 1448-56 (discussing the role of secured credit in
controlling debtor misbehavior).
55. See id. at 1449-52; George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and
Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155 (1994) (suggesting that security reduces the cash
available to management, thereby constraining debtor misbehavior); Hideki Kanda & Saul
Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103 (1994) (explaining how rules of
temporal priority limit the ability of the firm to engage in risky asset substitution, and that
exceptions to first-in-time priority rules may be needed to reintroduce flexibility where these
constraints prevent efficient investments); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-13 (1981) (criticizing the asset
substitution explanation for secured credit); Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the
Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 73, 78-82 (1993) (responding to Schwartz's
critique).
56. To use the example from above in which the shareholders reject a $35 investment with a
certain yield of $50, the shareholders would be willing to advance the $35 needed by the firm in
exchange for a promised repayment of, say, $45. This repayment would take priority over the
claims of existing creditors if the shareholders are able to take a security interest in the new
project and its proceeds. Thus, the ability to grant collateral may ameliorate the underinvestment
problem.
57. See Scott, supra note 30, at 1453-54.
58. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 53, at 1330.
59. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-53 (1979).
60. See generally George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995); Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 49, at
1010-11; Bergman & Callen, supra note 38, at 157-160 (explaining the use of debt covenants to
prevent management from threatening to dissipate firm assets in order to extract value from
creditors).
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loan agreement may provide that if the borrower acts in specified inap-
propriate ways (paying excess dividends, for example, or incurring addi-
tional debts), the lender may declare a default and accelerate the debt.
This may enable the lender to recover its loan before repayment
becomes impossible. It also imposes a cost on the borrower that dis-
courages violations of the covenants.
Secured credit and loan covenants may prevent misbehavior not
only by the debtor, but also by the firm's creditors. Monitoring by a
creditor may reduce the opportunity for equity holders to misappropriate
firm value or enter into overly-risky projects, benefitting all the firm's
creditors. Because the benefits are shared by all creditors but the costs
are borne by the monitoring creditor alone, creditors have an incentive to
free ride on each other's efforts and there is likely to be an inadequate
amount of monitoring. Thus, it has been suggested that one function of
loan covenants and collateral is to increase the incentives to monitor by
granting the monitoring creditor rights that will be triggered if it discov-
ers misbehavior by the debtor.6'
The problem with loan covenants and collateral as control devices
is that it is impossible to draft contracts that deal effectively with all
opportunities for misbehavior. For example, it is very hard to draft pro-
visions that will establish appropriate rules to govern the risk of asset
substitution because many of the attributes that would need to be veri-
fied are difficult to monitor or to prove in court.62 Thus, loan agree-
ments are generally silent on the borrower's permissible investments.63
3. BANKRUPTCY RULES
Fiduciary duties, secured credit, and loan covenants are all ex ante
controls, aimed at deterring agency problems. They are supplemented,
however, by a set of mandatory ex post rules for correcting various types
of destructive pre-bankruptcy manipulation. These are the rules of
bankruptcy, and this section focuses on three important categories: pref-
erence law, the control of managerial discretion during the bankruptcy
case, and the violation of absolute priority.
Preference law permits a debtor to recover certain payments made
61. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to
Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995). Security also renders the secured creditor's monitoring more
effective by giving the creditor leverage over the debtor should it discover the breach of a
covenant. See Scott, supra note 30, at 1450-51.
62. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW.
413 (1986) (arguing that covenants restricting investments and disposition of assets are rare and
trend is toward further reduction); Mitchell Berlin & Jan Loeys, Bond Covenants and Delegated
Monitoring, 43 J. FiN. 397 (1988).
63. See Buckley, supra note 27, at 249.
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to creditors shortly before filing for bankruptcy.64 This may enhance the
recovery of creditors as a whole in several ways. First, it may discour-
age a "race to the courthouse" that would destroy the debtor's going
concern value.65 Second, it may encourage creditors to continue to do
business with the debtor even though bankruptcy appears possible or
likely.66 Third, preference law may actually benefit financially troubled
firms by encouraging creditors to take enforcement actions sooner than
they otherwise would, thus stimulating corrective action before the firm
is "too far gone" to be saved. 67  Finally, Professor Adler has made a
persuasive case that preference law, intentionally or not, helps to miti-
gate the overinvestment problem.68  The effects of preference law are
discussed in conjunction with Deprizio doctrine below.69
A great deal of effort has gone into addressing the ways in which
the specific provisions of Chapter 11 control (or fail to control) agency
conflicts .70 Under Chapter 11, the management of a corporation gener-
64. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1999).
65. See, e.g., Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) ("By permitting the trustee to
avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into
bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables him to work his way out of a
difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his creditors.").
66. This is closely related to, yet distinct from, the first point. Preference law discourages
enforcement actions by creditors who might be inclined to try to enforce their rights. By doing so,
it actually allows other creditors to continue to do business with the debtor with less concern that
they will be last in line. For this reason, preference law contains exceptions intended to shield
creditors who continue to engage in ordinary course transactions with the debtor. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(1)-(5) (1999).
67. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 60, at 1094-96.
68. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 575 (1995). Professor Adler argues that preference law may be more important in
realigning pre-bankruptcy investment incentives than in fostering an equality between creditors.
By prohibiting cross-collateralization, it discourages firms from overinvestment. Without
preference law, shareholders might finance these investments by borrowing from an existing
creditor, who is induced to make this new secured loan through the offer of security for pre-
existing debt. There is a potential underinvestment problem as well, as firms decline to invest in
positive NPV opportunities because they must share gains with unsecured creditors. In reality,
preference law, however, probably does less to aggravate this problem because these may be
financeable on their own merit, without cross-collateralization. Moreover, Professor Adler
suggests firms entering into bankruptcy are likely to be poorly managed and so may be more
likely to have poor NPV options.
69. See infra Part III.A.
70. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganization: Reducing Costs,
Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581 (1993) (arguing that in all Chapter 11 cases, fundamental
decisions should be made by a trustee rather than by pre-bankruptcy management); Carlos J.
Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Reorganization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 382 (1998) (suggesting that Chapter 11 be amended to permit unsecured creditors to enforce
the debtor in possession's fiduciary duties); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts and the Brave
New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465 [hereinafter Skeel, Markets, Courts];
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
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ally retains control during the bankruptcy proceeding.71 At the same
time, the automatic stay suspends the ability of creditors to use their
contractual rights to monitor the debtor's management.7 2 In their place,
Chapter 11 provides a combination of creditor and judicial oversight.73
For example, while the debtor's management generally retains the
authority to make day-to-day decisions, those that are outside the "ordi-
nary course of business" must be approved by the court.74 Chapter 11
also provides for creditor committees to monitor debtors,75 and if man-
agement is incompetent or dishonest, a trustee can be appointed to take
control of the debtor or an examiner can be appointed to investigate the
debtor's affairs.76 These specific provisions are supplemented in a host
of ways, including the imposition of fiduciary duties on the debtor in
possession and the constant possibility that the court will end the
debtor's exclusivity period for filing a plan, lift the automatic stay, or
convert the case to liquidation under Chapter 7.
In the end, however, critics remain to be convinced that bankruptcy
offers an effective mechanism for controlling agency costs.77 It is often
asserted that management control, however necessary to preserve going
concern value, results in bankruptcy debtors favoring the interests of
equity holders over those of creditors (and perhaps favoring the interests
of management over equity).78 Moreover, the difficulties inherent in
Bankruptcy Code? (Pts. 1 & 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control].
71. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (1999).
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1999) (enjoining any actions against the debtor or the debtor's
property).
73. See Scott F. Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency Costs, and Voting Theory in Chapter 11,
46 U. KAN. L. REV. 507, 526-30 (1998) (discussing mechanisms for oversight and control of the
debtor in possession).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c) (1999) (providing that the trustee or debtor in possession may
enter into transactions in the ordinary course of business "without notice or a hearing" and, "after
notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property
of the estate").
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1999).
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1999).
77. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729
[hereinafter, LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11] (arguing that Chapter 11 fails to provide
appropriate incentives for managers in small business cases and that such cases take too long, and
proposing reforms).
78. See, e.g., Norberg, supra note 73, at 509 (stating that the bankruptcy system of controls
"fails to adequately constrain the [debtor-in-possession's] authority, permitting the DIP to act in
ways that decrease instead of maximize the value of firm assets"); Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11:
An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 Am. BANKR. L.J. 573, 576-78 (1995) (discussing "excessive
debtor control" in Chapter 11); Hon. Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and
Creditor Interests, 77 CORNELL L. Rv. 1088, 1091 (1992) ("The debtor is allowed to run the
business, and he usually runs it for his own benefit because he does not think he has too much
time left.").
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monitoring management in a bankruptcy case are substantially enhanced
in many small business bankruptcies, where few if any creditors have
large enough interests to justify taking an active role in monitoring the
debtor or the bankruptcy proceedings.79
Finally, various scholars have suggested that the routine violation
of absolute priority in bankruptcy - that is, the retention of value by
shareholders even though creditors have not been paid in full - is an
inducement offered to shareholders to reduce prebankruptcy agency
costs. 80 For example, Professor Randal Picker suggests that one risk
facing unsecured creditors is the possibility that a secured creditor will
foreclose on its collateral and retain its full value, even if the collateral is
worth more than the debt it secures. 81 The problem is that unsecured
creditors are in a poor position to monitor the value of the collateral, and
so cannot know if the secured creditor is being enriched at their expense.
The debtor, which is in a good position to monitor the value of the col-
lateral, has no incentive to do so if the value preserved would go entirely
to the unsecured creditors. Thus, Professor Picker suggests the violation
of absolute priority is an inducement offered to the debtor to file for
bankruptcy and preserve value for the unsecured creditors when there is
equity in the collateral. It is compensation for protecting the unsecured
creditors' interests.82
Similarly, Frierman and Viswanath show that the violation of abso-
lute priority reduces the incentive for overinvestment by permitting
79. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 44, at 119-20 (noting the collective action problem facing
small creditors in bankruptcy proceedings); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control -
Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Am. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983);
Skeel, supra note 70, at 511.
80. See, e.g., Daigle & Maloney, supra note 35 (suggesting that the violation of absolute
priority is accepted by bondholders as a means of reducing the incentive of equity holders to
transfer value to themselves as insolvency approaches); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante
Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1177-85 (1994)
(suggesting that violations of absolute priority should reduce underinvestment and asset
substitution by insolvent firms); William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and
Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1977); Randal C. Picker,
Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CrN. L. REV. 519 (1992). Others have
criticized the violation of absolute priority for causing various types of inefficiencies. See, e.g.,
Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules, 11 BELL
J. ECON. & MGrN. 550 (1980); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986). Professor Adler has specifically challenged the
view that violations of absolute priority are inherently superior to contractual resolutions of
financial agency costs. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
439, 473-75 (1992); see generally Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper
Role of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 (1994) [hereinafter Adler, Theoretical Divide]
(arguing that contractual arrangements can be designed to accomplish the proposed benefits
arising from the violation of absolute priority, but at lower cost).
81. Picker, supra note 80, at 531-46.
82. See id.
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shareholders to share in the assets of the firm even if it is insolvent.83
Others have argued that the violation of absolute priority can reduce the
underinvestment problem. Consider again Franks and Torous's illustra-
tion, where an insolvent firm rejects a project with a positive net present
value because the entire benefit would flow to the firm's creditors.84 If
bankruptcy rules reject the absolute priority rule and reduce the debt to
$75, thereby allowing shareholders to keep the value in excess of this
amount even though the creditors have not been repaid in full, the
investment becomes worthwhile for shareholders.
Most recently, Professors Posner and Kordana have offered a bar-
gaining model that generalizes these results.85 They note a tension
between respecting prebankruptcy entitlements and maximizing the
value of the estate because prebankruptcy entitlements make creditors
the residual interest holders while Chapter 11 leaves decision making
power in the hands of managers, who are presumably beholden to
equity. As they explain the functioning of Chapter 11, the debtor's
exclusivity period for proposing a plan: (1) gives the debtor the power to
violate prebankruptcy entitlements, putting the residual value of the firm
into the hands of equity;86 and, (2) gives management (equity) decision
making power (through agenda control), thereby reducing bargaining
costs by concentrating power in one party.87 Thus, decision making and
residual interest are brought together. Moreover, they are brought
together under the control of the party who presumably has the most
information, and so is best able to maximize firm value.88 The cost of
this efficiency is the rejection of creditors' nonbankruptcy entitlement to
priority over equity in the event of insolvency.
As an alternative to the violation of absolute priority, it has been
suggested that strict adherence to absolute priority, through the auto-
matic cancellation of all equity interests upon default, could be used to
mitigate financial agency costs.89 Professor Adler has pointed out that
83. Michael Frierman & P.V. Viswanath, Agency Problems of Debt, Convertible Securities,
and Deviation from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy, 37 J.L. & EcON. 455 (1994).
84. See supra Part H.A.
85. Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 L. REv. 161
(1999).
86. See id. at 187.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 188-89.
89. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political Theories] (describing a
contractual structure of "Chameleon Equity" as a possible alternative to bankruptcy law); Skeel,
supra note 70 (critiquing Adler's proposal); Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 811
(1994) (responding to Skeel); Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80 (expanding on the idea of
Chameleon Equity and distinguishing Adler's proposal from that of Bradley and Rosenzweig);
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J.
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the underinvestment problem could be resolved by provisions in the cor-
porate charter permitting the issuance of limited discount, high-priority
debt, combined with "chameleon equity." 90 Consider once again the
hypothetical insolvent firm in which the shareholders decline to invest
$35 to pursue a venture that would return $50. Under Adler's proposal,
the charter would permit the firm's management to issue $45 of priority
debt to the old equity holders for a price of $35.91 The $35 in proceeds
would be used to finance the investment. After the investment is suc-
cessfully completed, the equity holders would receive $45 on their prior-
ity debt, leaving $75 for the firm's creditors - the same resolution
hypothesized when absolute priority is abandoned.92 The ability of the
old equity holders to collect on their new, high-priority claim would be
contingent on the cancellation of their old equity interests.93 New equity
(worth $75) could then be issued to the old creditors (or a subset of the
old creditors) in compensation for their claims.94
Thus, a large number of common law, statutory, and contractual
rules have been developed to deal with various aspects of financial
agency costs. As shown in the following section, the insider guaranty is
properly understood as another tool in this same category.
III. AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE INSIDER GUARANTY
A. The Insider Guaranty as a Solution to Agency Problems
It is commonly said, both by courts and commentators, that the
purpose of an insider' s95 personal guaranty is to secure an additional
1043 (1992) (critiquing current Chapter 11 and proposing that bankruptcy law be amended to
automatically cancel equity interests upon default).
90. Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at 1116-18. This is related to the idea first put
forward by Jensen and Meckling, then formalized by Richard Green, that the issuance of
convertible debt can alleviate the overinvestment problem. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note
11, at 354; Richard Green, Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 115
(1984). But see Frierman & Viswanath, supra note 83 (showing that the improved incentive
structure created by issuance of convertible debt can be partially defeated if shareholders can trade
in derivative securities).
91. Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at 1116.
92. See id. at 1116-17.
93. See id. at 1117-18.
94. See id. at 1118.
95. "Insider" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1999) as "including" various parties with
close relationships to the debtor. In the case of a corporation, for example, insider includes "(i)
director of the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of the debtor; (iv)
partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; (v) general partner of the debtor; or (vi)
relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor." As the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code explains, "An insider is one who has a sufficiently
close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those
dealing at arms length with the debtor." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) 312,
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means of repayment should the debtor default on its obligations.96
While this function (referred to hereafter as "financial assurance") is cer-
tainly one reason for taking a guaranty, 97 it is not the only reason, and
may not even be the predominant one. While it is difficult to gather
reliable or detailed data on small business financing in general, and on
personal guaranties in particular,98 we do know a few things that can
help put a discussion of insider guaranties into context. First, a very
large number of small business loans are made with personal guaranties.
According to one recent study, for example, at least 45.7% of small
business loans, accounting for more than 58.8% of the outstanding dollar
amount, were personally guarantied in 1993. 9 Anecdotal information
confirms that many commercial lenders seldom extend credit to small
businesses without a personal guaranty - even if the insider giving the
guaranty has no net worth."°
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Report of the Comm. of the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.
2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5810.
96. See, e.g., NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, I1 F.3d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating that permitting the discharge of a debtor to release a guarantor would "defeat the purpose
of loan guaranties; after all, a lender obtains guaranties specifically to provide an alternative
source of repayment in the event that the primary obligor's debt is discharged in bankruptcy");
R.I.D.C. Ind. Development Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1095 (1977) ("One of the principal purposes for obtaining a guarantor to a note is to provide
an alternative source of repayment in the event that the principal obligor's debt is discharged in
bankruptcy. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Act provides that discharge in bankruptcy will not alter
the liability of a guarantor." (footnote omitted)).
97. Indeed, there is a growing economic literature on the value and functions of guaranties
given by third parties as further assurance of repayment. This is an area of the economy that has
seen explosive growth in recent decades in areas such as SBA loan guaranties, mortgage
insurance, default insurance on corporate or municipal bonds, and interest rate swaps. The
functions of these types of contracts are far removed from those of insider guaranties. For more
on the role of these financial, rather than control, guaranties, see generally, Van Son Lai, An
Analysis of Private Loan Guarantees, 6 J.FiN. SER. RES. 223 (1992); T.S. Campbell, On the
Optimal Regulation of Financial Guarantees, I J. REAL. EST. FIN. & ECON. 61 (1988); B. Hirtle,
The Growth of the Financial Guarantee Market, FED. RES. BANK OF NEW YORK QUARTERLY
REvmw 10 (Spring 1987); William C. Hunter, Insurance, Incentives, and Efficiency in Small
Business Lending, 50 SOUTHERN EcON. J. 1171 (1984).
98. As recently stated in one of the few empirical studies of personal guaranties, "[T]he
academic literature on the role of personal collateral and guarantees in small business finance is
limited, in part because few data sets include sufficient information to permit a thorough study."
Robert B. Avery, et al., The Role of Personal Wealth in Small Business Finance, 22 J. BANKING &
FIN. 1019, 1020 (1998).
99. See id. at 1052. These totals include loans which are guarantied, secured by personal
assets, or both. Due to limitations in the data available, certain loans that are likely to have been
personally guarantied or secured by personal assets were assumed not to have been, so these
numbers likely underestimate the extent of personal liability for small business debt. See id. at
1031-34. Offsetting this, 62.6% of loans with personal guaranties, and 36% of loans for which
personal assets were pledged but no personal guaranty was provided, were also secured by
corporate assets. See id. at 1052.
100. See id. at 1058 (reporting no consistent relationship between the use of personal
guaranties and owner wealth); see also Mann, supra note 9, at 24 n.86.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The reason for taking a guaranty from a party who is likely to be
judgment proof is no mystery. The goal is to obtain leverage over the
firm's decisions. This fact has often been noted in the literature and case
law, usually with disapproval.'' The consensus view seems to be that
this type of leverage is objectionable, that lenders seek it in order to
obtain an unfair position vis-a-vis the debtor and its other creditors. It is
true that lenders can use the leverage from an insider guaranty to obtain
preferential treatment relative to other creditors,10 2 but this is not the
only reason for seeking leverage through an insider guaranty, and the
proper treatment of these instruments requires an acknowledgment of
the positive functions of leverage.
As shown in the previous section, fiduciary duties, collateral and
covenants, and various bankruptcy rules are all used to alleviate the
agency costs that grow increasingly severe as a firm heads towards
insolvency. These devices are used with both public and private firms,
but they are clearly less effective with private firms. Secured credit may
be useful if the borrower has assets to pledge, but not all small firms
have significant assets to offer. 10 3 Loan covenants may lose much of
their effectiveness because they depend on monitoring by the creditor,
which may not be worthwhile on relatively small loans. Moreover, in
public companies, the ability to displace management and/or to shift
management powers from one class of claim holders to another can pro-
vide creditors with significant leverage.' °4 In private companies, the
knowledge and management abilities of insiders may be crucial to the
value of the firm, and so displacement is not a viable threat. Thus, in the
small firm context, creditors need some other way to ensure that insiders
manage the firm in a value-maximizing way even as the firm
101. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Clear Thinking About Insider Preferences, 77 MINN.
L. REv. 1393, 1395-96 (1993) [hereinafter Westbrook, Clear Thinking] ("The leverage guaranty
has only the illegitimate purpose of providing leverage for a lender preference."); Nussbaum,
supra note 9, at 614 ("In short, Bank's 'prudence' in obtaining the guarantee will often be a thinly
cloaked pursuit of a preference, and giving absolute protection to Bank merely encourages self-
interested conduct by Insider."); Diane Stehle Dix, Note, Avoidable Preferences in Bankruptcy:
The Status of the Insider Guarantee in the Wake of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re
V.N. Deprizio Construction Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1363, 1388-
89 ("To give absolute protection to the creditor [from the Deprizio doctrine] would simply
encourage self-dealing and lead to abuse of power by enabling the creditor to insist on a guarantee
to be used solely to pressure the debtor in making preferential payments, without regard to the
debtor's interest in preserving its integrity and paying its other creditors.").
102. See infra Part III.A.
103. Thus, Avery, finds that firms with few tangible assets that can be pledged as security are
more likely to offer lenders personal guaranties from their shareholders. Avery et al., supra note
98, at 1049.
104. See Buckley, supra note 27, at 249-50.
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approaches, or has entered, insolvency. This is the role of the insider
guaranty.
The insider guaranty reduces the costs of financial agency in a
number of important ways. First, it may provide an important signal
about the quality of the firm, reducing the cost of evaluating loan appli-
cations and improving the quality of the decisions made. Second, the
threat of personal liability mitigates the perverse incentives that nor-
mally affect shareholder/creditor relations in insolvency. It provides an
additional incentive for the guarantor to strive to save the debtor should
the firm get into financial trouble and encourages the guarantor to make
efficient decisions regarding investment policies and bankruptcy initia-
tion. Third, even after the guarantor pays on the guaranty, subrogation
or reimbursement rights place the guarantor in a position where its
incentives continue to be closely aligned with those of the firm's
creditors.
Thus, the first major function of the insider guaranty is as an infor-
mational and screening device. 10 5 The logic is simple enough: a poten-
tial lender knows that the borrower has more information about its
prospects than does the lender, and thus fears that important risks may
be concealed. Verbal assurances obviously can do little to assuage this
concern, and verification efforts (such as a detailed audit of the business)
are both fallible and expensive. An insider's agreement to put personal
assets at risk, however, is a strong signal that the insider believes the
firm will be able to repay.106 Thus, the insider guaranty reduces the cost
of the loan approval process and helps lenders avoid high risk borrow-
ers. This, in turn, lowers default rates and allows lenders to make small
business loans less expensive. 10
7
105. See, Avery et al., supra note 98, at 1022, 1024 (noting the value of the insider guaranty as
a screening device that mitigates adverse selection risks); Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 239 (same). Cf. F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy
Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986) (discussing the screening function of secured credit);
Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. Fn'. EcON. 187 (1984) (arguing that
secured credit arrangements reduce information costs).
106. See Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling
Approach, 8 BELL J. OF ECON. 23 (1977) (demonstrating that an incentive structure that will
penalize managers upon filing of bankruptcy can communicate nonobservable information to
investors). Note that the value of the signal does not necessarily depend on what the lender may
be able to recover from the insider should it ever sue on the guaranty, if the lender can inflict costs
on the insider through such a suit. The "in terrorem" effect of being able to foreclose on assets of
high personal value even if they have low market value, or of forcing the insider into bankruptcy
gives credence to the signal even if it does little to provide additional assets to repay the lender
upon the borrower's default. Cf Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor
Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 730 (1989) (noting the potential efficiency of signaling by granting
security interests in low value household goods).
107. See Katz, supra note 5, at 66, 68.
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Consider next the way the insider guaranty can mitigate perverse
prebankruptcy incentives, such as the incentive to delay bankruptcy in
the futile hope of turning around a failing company, or the incentive to
file an inefficient bankruptcy in order to extract concessions from lend-
ers. An insider guarantor knows that dissipation of the estate will
increase her liability on the guaranty, and the guarantor's position as
insider presumably gives her the ability to cause a bankruptcy filing.l08
Thus, to the extent that the decision to file for bankruptcy represents a
choice between shareholder, manager and creditor interests, an insider
guaranty becomes a means of encouraging efficient bankruptcy filings
and discouraging inefficient ones. 109
A great deal of attention has been directed to Professor Adler's sug-
gestion that the costs of financial distress could be reduced by the crea-
tion of "Chameleon Equity." 110 A firm could create a capital structure
that is essentially a tiered hierarchy of preferred equity, in which classes
would have collection rights, but no individual creditor would be able to
enforce its claim against the firm. II' Default would result in the elimi-
nation of the existing common stock and the conversion of the lowest
tier of "debt" into new common stock.' 1 2 This system would eliminate
the risk of inefficient dismemberment through a creditors' race to levy
against the firm, thus satisfying one of the primary functions of bank-
ruptcy. 13 In addition, by eliminating the bankruptcy proceeding itself,
Chameleon Equity would eliminate the costs of conflicting incentives
during the bankruptcy case.
While Chameleon Equity is an interesting theoretical possibility,
various factors prevent firms from creating such interests today. "4 An
insider guaranty, however, accomplishes essentially the same thing as
Chameleon Equity, but far more simply." 5 Consider the underinvest-
108. See id. at 70-71 (noting that a controlling shareholder is the residual claimant and can
monitor and police debtor misconduct, and so is well positioned to guarantee firm debt).
109. In 1997, Dun & Bradstreet reported that 83,384 businesses closed down without paying
their creditors in full. See Business Failures Rise for the First Time in Three Years, Business
Wire, March 2, 1998. There were, however, only 10,092 business Chapter 11 filings and 31,862
business Chapter 7 filings. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, table F-2. Thus, no more than half of the business failures
in 1997 were administered through the bankruptcy courts.
110. See Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 89 (proposing chameleon equity);
Adler, A World Without Debt, supra note 89 (responding to critics); Adler, Theoretical Divide,
supra note 80 (expanding on the idea of chameleon equity and responding to critics).
I 1. See Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 89, at 323-33.
112. Id.; Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at 1118.
113. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 89, at 323-24.
114. See Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at 1129-31; Adler, Financial and Political
Theories, supra note 89, at 333-41.
115. That is not to say that other contractual arrangements may not be used to align
management interests with the interests of creditors when a firm is insolvent. See Gilson &
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ment hypothetical presented in Part II.A., supra, in which shareholders
of an insolvent firm saw no reason to invest $35 in a project that would
return $50. Now assume the firm's debt is guarantied by its sole share-
holder. Without the new investment, the shareholder is liable for a $30
deficiency ($100 in debt less $70 in assets). If the investment is made,
this liability drops to $15 ($100 in debt, less $70 in existing assets and
$15 net profit from the new investment). The insider guaranty presents
a simple contractual solution to the underinvestment problem by making
the insider the firm's residual claimant until the guarantied debt is
repaid.' 16 Successful investments by the borrower will increase the
amount of the debt the borrower can repay, thus reducing the insider's
liability on its guaranty.1 17
The guaranty also bonds the insider to work for the rehabilitation of
the debtor should it fall on hard times, rather than abandoning the enter-
prise. Particularly in businesses where individual knowledge and effort
are key assets, an owner who does not face the prospect of personal
liability may be tempted to use his or her human capital and goodwill to
start a new enterprise in the same line of business, free from the debts
incurred by the prior, failed enterprise. While a personal guaranty can-
not ensure that the proprietor will not follow this path (at least as long as
personal bankruptcy remains an option for discharging the personal lia-
bility), it does reduce the possibility by limiting the insider's ability to
retain personal capital with which to start the new business.
Similarly, the risk of dissipation or misappropriation of the firm's
assets is lessened. With bankruptcy approaching, shareholders may seek
to extract value from the company through dividends, the repayment of
insider debt, or fraudulent transfers. 18 An insider guaranty reduces the
guarantor's incentive to drain the firm in these ways, and also encour-
ages the guarantor to prevent such behavior by other insiders who may
not have joined in the guaranty.1 19
In the same way, insider guaranties may reduce the risk of ineffi-
Vetsuypens, supra note 49, at 1015-19 (reporting on companies that tied executive compensation
to creditor recoveries as part of debt restructuring plans both inside and outside of bankruptcy).
116. Moreover, this may negate the basic justification for shifting fiduciary duties to the
creditors upon insolvency. If the equity holder continues to be the residual claimant, the directors'
and/or managers' fiduciary duties should continue to run to the equity holders.
117. Equivalently, if the insider has already been forced to pay on his guaranty, he gains rights
against the borrower by subrogation or indemnification. Any increase in the borrower's assets
will increase the insider's recovery on these claims.
118. See Lin, supra note 49, at 1494. Cases have held that the use of a corporation's funds to
pay guarantied debt can be a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., South Falls Corp. v. Rochelle,
329 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1964); In re Holly Hill Medical Center, Inc. 53 B.R. 412 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985); In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co., Inc., 41 B.R. 476 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984).
119. See Katz, supra note 5, at 73-74.
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cient dismemberment of the firm through a "race to the courthouse."
Suppose there is a firm with $100 in debt, and assets that are worth $80
as a going concern but only $70 if they are split up and sold piecemeal.
Shareholders have no stake in whether the firm is dismembered or not;
either way, there is no value for equity. 20  An insider guarantor, on the
other hand, has an incentive to resist a value-reducing dismember-
ment. 121 In this way, the insider guaranty may reinforce the goals of
preference law by motivating insiders to resist inefficient creditor
pressures. 122
The insider guaranty may mitigate the race to the courthouse in a
second way. It reassures the guarantied creditors that the manager is
interested (due to his residual liability) in maximizing the creditors'
recoveries. A creditor is likely to feel substantially less need to close
down the debtor if it is confident that the firm is being managed to maxi-
mize the creditor's well-being, rather than the well-being of equity hold-
ers. 12  Indeed, this appears to be a primary reason commercial lenders
take insider guaranties: They do not expect to foreclose on their collat-
eral or force a bankruptcy filing upon default.1 24 They want to leave the
firm in the borrower's hands, because the borrower should best be able
to maximize the value of its assets.1 25 To do this, however, the creditor
needs some assurance that the borrower will try to maximize the value
120. They may resist dismemberment in order to preserve their jobs or extend the option
represented by their equity interests.
121. Note that the guarantor will not resist a value-maximizing dismemberment because
resisting would increase liability.
122. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 76 MWn'N. L.
REv. 73, 85 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Two Thoughts].
123. An insider guaranty may further increase the ability of the firm to resolve problems
without dismemberment or bankruptcy, if paired with a blanket lien on the firm's assets. Apart
from the primary creditor, there is little incentive for creditors to pursue the debtor, since all of its
assets are encumbered. Thus, the threat of dismemberment is remote, and, with the collective
action problem thereby minimized, the equity holders and the primary creditor can negotiate
toward an efficient resolution. In other words, the combination of "all asset" financing with an
insider guaranty may provide the primary benefits of a bankruptcy reorganization scheme (staying
enforcement by creditors, while permitting the firm to maximize its asset values) without the need
for a bankruptcy filing. Cf Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991).
124. See generally Mann, supra note 9 (arguing that foreclosure often results in losses for the
lender, but the threat of foreclosure is used to induce borrowers to resolve the lending situation
efficiently); Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 84 n.46.
125. This is consistent with the argument, advanced by Professor Bowers, that small business
debtors are normally able to liquidate their enterprises more efficiently than courts or creditors.
See James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory
and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097 (1990); James W. Bowers,
Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics
of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991).
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of the business for application to the debt. This assurance is provided by
the personal guaranty.
It is worth noting that these beneficial incentive alignment effects
exist prior to payment of the debt by either the guarantor or borrower,
because the guarantor is concerned with minimizing its personal liabil-
ity. It also exists after repayment of the debt by the guarantor assuming
the guarantor has the right to reimbursement or subrogation to the credi-
tor's claim, because the insider will want to maximize his recovery from
the debtor.126 In such a situation, the insider shares with other creditors
in the assets of the estate and thus will want to maximize the payout to
creditors.
The insider guaranty is no panacea, of course. First of all, it does
not fully correct inefficient incentives unless the insider has guarantied
all of the firm's debts, because the insider is not the sole residual claim-
ant. He must share any profits or benefits with other creditors, and thus
still faces some level of inappropriate incentives.1 27  The beneficial
incentive effects of insider guaranties can be further defeated or miti-
gated in several ways that are worth noting. First, there is the possibility
that the guarantor will be judgment proof, or have a net worth so limited
as to render the threat of deficiency liability insignificant. Second, it is
always possible, particularly in the case of a small business failure, that
the guarantor will go into bankruptcy and discharge the guaranty obliga-
tion. An insider guaranty will also lose its effectiveness if the guarantied
creditor is able to secure repayment of its debt from the borrower prior
to the preference period. That is, if a creditor can use its leverage over
the insider to secure repayment from the company, the guaranty will
126. Absent an express waiver, a guarantor has a right to reimbursement from the borrower for
any amounts paid under the guaranty. See RESTATEMENT (TmiRD) oF SURErYSHIP AND GuARANTY
§§ 22-25 (1995). If the guarantor satisfied the claim owed to the creditor, the guarantor also
becomes subrogated to the creditor's rights against the borrower. See id. at §§ 27-31.
127. For example, return again to the overinvestment hypothetical presented in Part lI.A. The
shareholders of a firm with $70 in assets and $100 in debt choose to invest $30 in a project with a
10% chance of returning $200 and a 90% of returning nothing - even though the investment has
a negative net present value. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. A solvent shareholder/
guarantor would reject this investment in order to reduce its expected personal liability. If the
investment is made, the shareholder/guarantor's position has an expected value of negative $40:
an expected guaranty liability of (10% x $0) + (90% x $60) = $54, partially offset by an equity
value of (10% x $140) + (90% x $0) = $14. If the investment is not made, the guarantor faces
liability of $30.
Suppose, however, that the shareholder had guarantied just half of the firm's debt. If the
investment is not made, the shareholder's position is worth negative $15 (no equity value, liability
for fifty percent of the $30 in unpaid debt). If the investment is made, the shareholder's position
is worth $14 in equity value less an expected guaranty liability of (10% x 0 ) + (90% x $30) = $27,
for a total value of negative $13. Thus, the investment improves the guarantor's position despite
the partial guaranty of the firm's debt, although not by as much as when the debt was
unguarantied.
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have accomplished its immediate purpose from the perspective of the
lender, but the elimination of the insider's contingent creditor status will
also destroy the beneficial incentive effects discussed above. Issues
raised by these limitations are addressed in various sections below.
B. Insider Guaranties versus Other Control Devices
Light may be shed on the appropriate treatment of insider guaran-
ties by exploring the similarities of an insider guaranty to a security
interest; the analogy is much closer than is often acknowledged.'28 This
comparison is presented below, following a brief comparison of insider
guaranties with the two other primary methods of controlling the share-
holder/creditor conflict, fiduciary duties and loan covenants.
As described above,'29 fiduciary duties may offer a partial solution
to financial agency problems, but fiduciary duties are a very blunt
tool.' 30 First, of course, the business judgment rule presents an impor-
tant barrier to suits for breach of the duty of care in all but the most
egregious cases.' 3' Even beyond the practical problems, however, fidu-
ciary duties are poorly calibrated. Directors owe their fiduciary duties to
the shareholders until the firm is "in the vicinity of insolvency" (when-
ever that is), when those duties suddenly shift to include the firm's cred-
itors. But the perverse incentives faced by shareholders and managers
do not suddenly appear; they vary smoothly, with incentives shifting
proportionately as the firm's fortunes wax and wane.'32 A dichotomous
regime of fiduciary duties owed to one set of claim holders or another
cannot easily accommodate these gradations. The incentive effects of
the guaranty, however, vary directly with the magnitude of the agency
problem. As a firm gets nearer to insolvency, the probability and likely
amount of guaranty liability increase, making the insider-guarantor more
like a creditor and less like a shareholder. In other words, as the agency
problem grows, so does the countervailing effect of the guaranty. This
128. Professor Mann has commented on the similarities of secured credit and insider
guaranties. See, Mann, supra note 9, at 10. For an analogy between the two in the context of co-
debtor stays, see Zaretsky, supra note 105, at 233.
129. See supra Part I.B.I.
130. See, e.g., Ramesh K.S. Rao, et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic
Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 63-64
(1996) (noting the difficulty of determining when a firm is in "the vicinity of insolvency" and
director's duties should shift).
131. See supra text accompanying note 50.
132. This was recognized in Credit Lyonnaise and resulted in the court's holding that "at least
where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely
the agent of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise." Credit
Lyonnaise Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 LEXIS 215, at *83 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in identifying the "vicinity of
insolvency," see Barondes, supra note 35, at 71-72.
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makes the guaranty a much more finely tuned instrument than the law's
default regime of fiduciary duties.
Next, compare the insider guaranty with loan covenants. The effec-
tiveness of loan covenants in mitigating agency problems depends
directly on the ability of the parties to specify in the loan documents, in
an enforceable way, the behavior that is permitted or prohibited. 33 For
various types of potential misbehavior, this may prove impossible.1 34
And to the extent that the loan documents do provide specific standards
against which to measure the debtor's activity (or prescribe a general
norm such as "good faith"), the parties will be faced with the costs of
monitoring the debtor for compliance, bringing an enforcement action
should violations be detected, and hoping that the court can arrive at an
accurate determination. 13  The insider guaranty, in contrast, gradually
realigns the incentives faced by management without the need for any
legal action by the creditor, thus minimizing monitoring, enforcement
and error costs.' 36
Finally, consider the insider guaranty as compared with secured
credit. As discussed above, secured credit is a means of controlling vari-
ous agency problems.137 Although there are a number of plausible
explanations for the ways in which security works, collateral reduces
agency costs in large part by disabling the borrower from engaging in
many actions without the consent of the secured creditor. Consequently,
security interests sometimes prevent the borrower from engaging in
desirable acts, preventing efficient investments by the borrower.138
Insider guaranties do not create inefficient restrictions of this sort.
Security may also be a method borrowers and secured creditors use
to appropriate value from other creditors.1 39 Whether or not this redistri-
133. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 27, at 270-77.
134. See Clifford W. Smith & Jerrold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FiN. EcON. 117, 153 (1970).
135. See Buckley, supra note 27, at 256 (noting that types of enforcement actions and costs
that may be required of creditors relying on loan provisions to replace wayward management).
136. In this sense, the insider guaranty is similar to an ipso facto clause, a provision that makes
filing for bankruptcy an event of default. Unlike most other loan covenants, which proscribe
specific actions, an ipso facto clause "relies on a rough but easily determined, surrogate for
increased riskiness. As such, an ipso facto clause performs a general function that could not be
done as well by another, more specific, contract term." Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 851, 889-90 (1982).
137. See supra Part I.B.2.
138. See, e.g., Smith & Warner, supra note 134, at 128; Scott, supra note 30, at 1452.
139. Even if secured credit is an efficient institution overall, it may reallocate value as between
the debtor its secured creditor and its unsecured creditors. As an unsecured creditor, you are at
risk that the debtor will grant a security interest, thereby reducing the expected recovery on your
claim. Indeed, this ability to redistribute value away from unsecured creditors may induce debtors
to borrow on a secured basis even where the granting of collateral is inefficient. See Lucian Arye
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bution is unfair, 14  it may induce the parties to enter into economically
inefficient secured transactions. 14' That is, the use of security may
engender greater total costs than benefits but, because some of the costs
are externalized onto nonadjusting creditors, the firm and lender use
security anyway.
The same can be said for insider guaranties. They may alleviate
various agency problems, but they may also redistribute value from
nonadjusting creditors to the guarantied lender if the guarantied creditor
can use its additional leverage to improve its treatment. Yet unsecured
creditors are fully aware of this risk,'42 and from the perspective of the
typical unsecured creditor, an insider guaranty is far less threatening
than the granting of security. After all, a guaranty does not give the
lender an automatic preferred position with respect to any of the debtor's
assets, as a security interest does. Moreover, a guaranty may increase
the total assets available to settle the debtor's claims by bringing in the
guarantor's assets (at least where the guarantor has waived its right to
reimbursement from the debtor 43 or where the guarantor will be reim-
bursed only in part due to the debtor's insolvency). Creditors may fur-
ther benefit because the guarantor's right to reimbursement provides an
incentive to maximize the payout to the creditor class to which he or she
belongs. 44
If insider guaranties are functionally close to security interests, we
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857, 895-902 (1995).
140. This redistribution is not unfair to the extent that the creditors who lose out are aware of
their risk and can on average charge a price for their credit that fully compensates them. See
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 53, at 1300-03; cf. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re Deprizio
Constr. Corp.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary
arrangements do not operate 'inequitably' in the business world" because parties will adjust the
price of credit to reflect the effects of the rule). On the other hand, various creditors may be
unable to adjust the "price" they charge the firm for "credit" such as tort creditors, and this
redistribution is arguably unfair as to these nonadjusting creditors. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra
note 53, at 1304-07, 1313-14.
141. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 53, at 1304-21.
142. Indeed, as early as 1848, one state supreme court refused to condemn insider preferences
on exactly these grounds: "The stockholder and the stranger, who are both creditors of a
corporation, no doubt stand in very unequal positions. But it is an inequality which the law
allows, and which is understood by those who contract with corporations, and one which will
always tend, more or less, to bring in doubt the credit of such bodies." Whitewell v. Warner, 20
Vt. 425, 444-45 (1848) (quoted in John C. McCoid, Corporate Preferences to Insiders, 43 S.C. L.
REV. 805, 820 (1992)).
143. On the use of such waivers, see infra Part IV.A.
144. The firm's general unsecured creditors clearly would prefer the existence of guarantied
unsecured debt over secured debt, because a secured creditor is guarantied repayment up to the
value of its collateral and has a reduced incentive to monitor the debtor. They also may prefer that
the firm's primary creditor holds guarantied unsecured debt, rather than unguarantied unsecured
debt, if the increases in efficiency outweigh the risk of preferential treatment.
INSIDER GUARANTIES IN BANKRUPTCY
might expect similar rules to apply to each. Consider the differences in
legal doctrine, however. Three crucial distinctions can be drawn
between secured credit and an insider guaranty. First, secured credit is
accorded its prior rights only if it has been recorded, and so, it may be
argued, unsecured creditors are on notice. No similar recording is either
required or provided for with guaranties. Second, the secured creditor
obtains a well-defined priority in particular assets, while an insider guar-
anty merely increases the lender's leverage. This arguably results in
greater uncertainty for other creditors as to the effects of the guaranty
compared to the effects of security.' 45 Finally, a distinction can be and
often is drawn between the "property rights" conveyed by a security
interest as opposed to the mere "contract rights" created by a
guaranty.
146
The results of these distinctions appear in the different ways secur-
ity and suretyship are conceptualized temporally. That is, the transfer of
a property interest in the collateral is thought of as occurring when the
security interest is perfected, rather than when the leverage created by
the security interest is used to obtain a payment from the borrower.
Thus, the "transfer" often occurs long before the debtor gets into finan-
cial trouble. This protects payments made near bankruptcy from being
considered preferential.147 In the case of the guaranty, the transfer is
viewed as occurring when the payment is made, thus subjecting pay-
ments shortly before bankruptcy to preference law. This is a purely
arbitrary conclusion, however.148 Conceptually, the guaranty could be
145. Too much could be made of this argument because secured creditors do not simply
foreclose when the firm gets into financial trouble. They use the leverage provided by the threat
of foreclosure to influence firm decision making - the same way a lender can use an insider
guaranty.
146. The limits of this distinction are pointed out by Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CFH. L. REv. 97, 112, 114 (1984)
(stating that security provides the lender with property rights in specific assets, but also noting that
"the property right.., is principally a means to an end - priority as against third parties with
regard to payment .... The probability of repayment and not any intrinsic interest in the collateral
itself is the principal element of the value of his bargain with the debtor"). This same insight is
recognized in mortgage law through the "lien theory" of mortgages: that even though a mortgage
may purport to transfer title to the collateral to the lender, the property right received by the lender
is simply title as security for repayment of the debt. For a discussion and critique of the thesis that
the fifth amendment protects the property rights of secured creditors, see James Steven Rogers,
The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study Of The Relationship
Between The Fifth Amendment And The Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973 (1983).
147. A payment can be avoided as a preference under the Bankruptcy Code only if it is made
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing, or within one year of the filing if it is made to or for the
benefit of a creditor who is an insider. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1999).
148. The arbitrary nature of this determination is well shown by comparison with the treatment
of standby letters of credit, which are in many ways a substitute for a guaranty. When a bank
issues a letter of credit on the borrower's behalf for the benefit of a lender and the lender later
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viewed the same way as a security agreement: at the initiation of the
debtor-creditor relationship, the debtor grants the lender a mechanism
for increased leverage to obtain repayment should the debtor get into
financial trouble in the future.
Under current law, the problem with this perspective is one of
notice. Because of the way secured credit has been conceptualized, a
mechanism has been provided for giving notice of security interests to
third parties, and a security interest is only valid as against those third
parties if notice has been provided. The law, however, has neither
required nor created a mechanism to provide notice of guaranties, so
other creditors have no easy way of knowing that a lender has obtained
the leverage of an insider guaranty. Yet this distinction between secured
credit and guaranties is less convincing on closer examination of the
way notice operates with secured credit: after all, a secured creditor does
not have priority in its collateral only as to subsequent unsecured credi-
tors, who knew or could have known of its lien. It also has priority over
prior unsecured creditors, a result defended with the observation that
these creditors were on notice that the borrower might grant subsequent
security interests. In the same way, however, creditors of a closely-held
firm are on "notice" that insiders may guaranty firm obligations, provid-
ing leverage to the guarantied creditor.
To the extent that insider guaranties and security interests appear to
serve similar functions, it would seem that the treatment of secured
credit, which has been closely studied, should provide some guidance in
thinking about the appropriate treatment of insider guaranties - despite
the seemingly arbitrary differences in legal categorization that could lead
to inconsistent treatment.149
To summarize, then, insider guaranties are an important device for
limiting financial agency costs. They are bonding devices that help
ensure that managers carry out the firm's bargain with its lenders, thus
reducing the total cost of capital. Moreover, the insider guaranty has an
advantage over other monitoring and policing devices because it works
in a fundamentally different way. Controlling a borrower through collat-
eral may require the imposition of restrictions that will turn out to be too
draws down the letter of credit to recover on its debt, the transfer to the lender is deemed to have
occurred upon the issuance of the letter of credit, rather than upon the payment under it. See, e.g.,
Perlstein v. Lamber Coal Co. (In re AOV Ind., Inc.), 64 B.R. 933 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1986); Briggs
Transp. Co. v. Norwest Bank (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 37 B.R. 76 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
149. This view informs the discussions of the law in Part IV, infra, but it is of even greater
importance in analyzing the validity of bankruptcy court injunctions against the enforcement of
insider guaranties. While I address this matter to some extent in Part IV.B., infra, discussing
springing and exploding guaranties, the broader issue deserves more detailed attention than it can
be given in this article.
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tight, barring efficient investments or requiring expensive renegotia-
tions. Relying on covenants or fiduciary duties requires constant vigi-
lance by the lender because breaches must be identified and enforcement
actions brought. Thus, these devices entail substantial monitoring and
enforcement costs (in addition to the error costs of flawed judicial
decisions).
The insider guaranty, in contrast, minimizes costs by changing the
decisionmaker's incentives, thereby reducing the desirability of misbe-
havior without barring any specific course of conduct.1 50 Enforcement
is relatively inexpensive, because a guaranty suit requires no proof that a
condition or legal duty has been violated. All that a plaintiff must show
is that the borrower failed to make a payment when due. It is this
remarkable economy, not the leverage to induce wrongful preferential
conduct, that most likely accounts for the ubiquity of insider guaranties.
To the extent that this benefits the firm, all of the parties with stakes in
the firm - including the creditors who do not hold guaranties - should
be better off.
This does leave a lingering mystery, however. Insider guaranties
should often help to prevent inefficient prebankruptcy behavior and
should reduce the number of inappropriate bankruptcy filings, yet
observers seem to agree that small business reorganization cases are
often filed when there is little or no hope of success, and that these cases
often drag on beyond any reasonable limits of time and expense. 151 If
insider guaranties are so effective in aligning shareholder and creditor
incentives, and if they are so universally used, then why is the small
business bankruptcy system perceived as so ineffective? The answer
lies, I believe, in exploring when a bankruptcy case will be filed despite
the existence of an insider guaranty, and the effects of the guaranty on
the path of the bankruptcy case.
C. Insider Guaranties and Bankruptcy Negotiation
If there is a recurring theme in commentary on small business reor-
ganization cases, it is that they take too long, cost too much, and are
150. Cf. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAW 126-32 (1991) (noting the efficiency of
inculcated norms, compared to external monitoring and enforcement, in inducing desirable
behavior).
151. Thus, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission could refer to "two distinct
categories of small business Chapter 11 cases .... The first category consists of the relatively
small proportion of cases in which the debtor has a reasonable likelihood of confirming a plan and
succeeding as a going business ... The second category consists of the much larger proportion of
cases in which the debtor has no reasonable prospect of rehabilitation." NATIONAL BAKarR.
REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUtPTCy: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARs 609 (1997).
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often unworthy of the effort.1 52 Indeed, the data clearly show that large
firms are far more likely than small firms to succeed in reorganiza-
tion. 53 If insider guaranties are so common in the small firm setting,
and if they provide appropriate incentives in insolvency, why should
small business bankruptcies seem so dissatisfactory in practice? The
answer lies at least partly in the selection effects created by insider
guaranties.
Rationally, we can expect small businesses to file for bankruptcy,
despite the existence of an insider guaranty, in either of two basic cir-
cumstances. First, where the reorganization is expected to be value
maximizing, the insider will cause the firm to file in order to minimize
his guaranty liability. 54 Second, if the insider is insolvent, the guaranty
will have little deterrent effect and the insider may file an inefficient
case despite the likelihood of increased liability on the guaranty.155
This covers the relationship between the insider guaranty and bank-
ruptcy initiation from a rational perspective, but the irrational, emotional
aspect also merits attention. It has often been noted that financially dis-
tressed debtors may cling to any straw of hope, and legal rules are
imposed in a number of contexts to protect debtors from unrealistic
dreams of financial recovery.1 56 This failing is also observed in the
world of bankruptcy. A distressed business may file for Chapter 11
reorganization not because recovery is probable, or even possible, but
because the owner is unwilling to face the economic realities - and the
152. See, e.g., LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter I1, supra note 77. For an examination of
the direct costs of small business bankruptcy cases, see generally Robert M. Lawless, et al., A
Glimpse of Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 847 (showing direct costs in excess of 26% of the distributions made to unsecured creditors).
For a discussion of the total costs of bankruptcy relative to their benefits, see Marshall E. Tracht,
Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
301, 321-26 (1997) [hereinafter Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers].
153. In one study of public companies in bankruptcy, for example, more than 90% of debtors
confirmed reorganization plans. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 125, 137-41 (1990). In contrast, a study of 260 Chapter 11 cases found that just forty-five
resulted in confirmed plans, nine of which called for liquidation of the debtor. Of the remaining
thirty-six, it appeared that only seventeen plans were actually consummated, for an overall rate of
operating firms of just 6.5%. See Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans
Consummate? The Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 CoM. L.J. 297, 316-30 (1992);
see also Nancy Rhein Baldiga, Is This Plan Feasible? An Empirical Legal Analysis of Plan
Feasibility, 101 CoM. L.J. 115 (1996) (reporting that half of the confirmed, nonliquidating plans
failed to consummate, despite the required judicial finding of "feasibility").
154. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109.
155. Moreover, if such a case is filed, the insider guaranty may make reorganization more
difficult to accomplish. See infra Part II.C.
156. See, e.g., Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 152, at 343 (noting that the
equity of redemption and other borrower protections are often not waivable, thereby protecting
borrowers from the "mirage of hope").
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cost of denying reality for a few more months or years is placed largely
on the firm's creditors. 15 7  A personal guaranty can help correct poor
incentives, but it does little to cure wishful thinking.'58 Thus, we can
expect small business filings to be a mixture of efficient and inefficient
cases, although with fewer inefficient cases than we would see absent
insider guaranties.
There may be another important relationship between insider guar-
anties and the excessive failure rate of small business bankruptcies.
While closely held firms are most likely to file for bankruptcy when
insider guaranties have been rendered valueless through the insider's
lack of assets, that does not make the guaranty irrelevant to the parties'
conduct within the bankruptcy proceeding. Under plausible assump-
tions, an insider guaranty can destroy the borrower's reorganization
incentives and create a potentially destructive negotiating dynamic.
The problem is that, assuming the guaranty cannot be discharged
through the borrower's bankruptcy case, 159 any value retained by the
guarantor under the plan will be available to the creditor in a suit on the
guaranty. Thus, where the assets available to the creditor under the plan
and from the guarantor are not sufficient to result in payment in full, the
insider guaranty can render reorganization pointless from the guarantor's
perspective, even if it is value-maximizing for creditors. 6 ° This is sim-
157. One exasperated bankruptcy court judge described the situation this way:
Bankruptcy is perceived as a haven for wistfulness and the optimist's valhalla where
the atmosphere is conducive to fantasy and miraculous dreams of the phoenix rising
from the ruins. Unfortunately, this Court is not held during the full moon, and while
the rays of sunshine sometimes bring the warming rays of the sun, they more often
also bring the bright light that makes transparent and evaporates the elaborate
fantasies constructed of nothing more than gossamer wings and of sophisticated tax
legerdemain.
In re Maxim Indus., Inc., 22 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
158. One bankruptcy with which I am personally familiar involved a small retail establishment
in an industry that is being consolidated under a few nationwide chains whose costs are
substantially lower than those of independent stores. Given the underlying economics, the
business was doomed, yet the owner, who had inherited the business from his parents, was
emotionally unwilling to acknowledge this fact. After a two-year stay in bankruptcy court, a plan
of reorganization was confirmed using the "new value exception" to the absolute priority rule.
Under the plan, some debts were discharged, the owner took out a mortgage on his house (his only
asset outside the company) to add capital to the business, and he personally guarantied the store
lease. The end result was a "successful" bankruptcy in that a Chapter 11 plan was confirmed and
consummated. In reality, the result was that the owner struggled for four additional years to save
the business, working without a salary. When the store finally closed, the owner was saddled not
just with the loss of the business he would have had six years earlier, but also with a six-figure
mortgage on his modest home. Bankruptcy could not change the fact that the store was not
economically viable. All it could do was keep a negative-present-value enterprise alive for six
years longer than would have been likely without Chapter 11.
159. See infra Part IV.B.
160. From this observation, it could be argued that insider guaranties should be dischargeable
in the borrower's bankruptcy case. Indeed, several courts appear to have granted at least
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ply another version of the underinvestment problem. 161
It could be argued that the guaranty does not preclude reorganiza-
tion, it just reallocates bargaining power during the proceedings. The
owners of a closely held firm gain substantial leverage through the nego-
tiating structure imposed by a bankruptcy filing. Insiders retain their
major threat against creditors: that they will walk away, taking all of
their firm-specific human capital with them and depriving the firm of its
going concern value. 16 2  Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code gives the
debtor in possession an exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganiza-
tion for a period that can be, and often is, extended indefinitely. 163 It also
may permit a plan to be confirmed by "cramdown" over the objection of
temporary protection to insider guarantors on precisely these grounds. Thus, in In re Northlake
Bldg Partners, 41 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1984), the bankruptcy court granted a temporary
injunction staying suit on a personal guaranty given by the debtor's sole general partner, on
grounds that he was crucial to managing the debtor's profitable hotel and that the debtor would be
"irreparably harmed" by the loss of the guarantor/manager. Similarly, in Codfish Corp. v. FDIC
(In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1988), the FDIC settled with two insider
guarantors, but not with the firm's president, Mr. da Cunha, who had special expertise needed for
any reorganization. The bankruptcy court granted a temporary injunction barring the FDIC from
pursuing Mr. da Cunha, who stated he would have no incentive to work for the debtor if his
earnings would just be subject to judgment by FDIC. See id. at 134.
These courts never address why the suit on the guaranty would cause the guarantor to stop
working to save the debtor. If the court were really correct that the manager was crucial, then the
creditor may have good reason to cut a deal that will keep the manager's expertise available. One
suspects that the courts' reasoning involved a level of disingenuousness. In In re Northlake, the
court previously had ruled that the creditor was oversecured, so the court may have been
concerned that the creditor was seeking to accelerate a below market rate loan. In re Northlake,
41 B.R. at 232. Moreover, if the creditor was fully secured, the costs of a foregone reorganization
would accrue entirely to unsecured creditors and equity holders, and the guarantied creditor would
be indifferent between liquidation and reorganization. On these facts, actions by the secured
creditor that endanger the reorganization should be stayed.
In In re Codfish Corp., the court noted that Mr. Da Cunha had no assets, so the FDIC
supposedly lost nothing from the injunction. However, if he really had no assets, the injunction
was unnecessary. The FDIC would have no incentive to go after him, and, if it irrationally did so,
Mr. Da Cunha could file for bankruptcy with no loss. If his expertise was so crucial, the FDIC, as
the firm's primary creditor, should be willing to cut a deal. After all, they compromised with the
debtor and two other guarantors. Although there is no way to tell from the opinion, the FDIC may
have believed the guarantor was somehow holding out, and was using the leverage of the guaranty
to prevent this - in which case, the court enjoined the FDIC from using the guaranty to
accomplish precisely the goals the guaranty had been intended to further. In re Codfish Corp., 97
B.R. at 97. On the other hand, the court may have believed that the FDIC had ulterior motives or
was not negotiating in good faith (a thought that would probably not surprise anyone who dealt
with the FDIC in midst of the savings and loan crisis) and thus was seeking to break a negotiating
impasse by restraining the FDIC.
161. Moreover, by reducing the prospect that an insolvent guarantor will be able to retain a
stake through reorganization, the guaranty may prevent the prospect of deviations from absolute
priority from mitigating perverse prebankruptcy incentives. See supra text accompanying notes
80-88.
162. See Baird & Picker, supra note 123, at 318-24.
163. See Kordana & Posner, supra note 85, at 182-90.
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some creditors.'" This combination gives insiders control of the bar-
gaining agenda, which can allow them to extract the lion's share of the
firm's going concern value.16 5 On top of these legal advantages, insid-
ers often have informational advantages that give them an important
edge in negotiating a plan of reorganization. 66
Creditors, on the other hand, are deprived of their primary negotiat-
ing threat (enforcement of their contractual rights against the borrower)
by operation of the automatic stay. 16 7 If the firm's shareholders are lia-
ble on personal guaranties that exceed their assets, however, any value
extracted by virtue of these bargaining advantages is subject to levy and
attachment by the guarantied creditor. Moreover, the automatic stay,
which bars creditors from pursuing remedies against the borrower once
it files for bankruptcy, does not enjoin suits against third party guaran-
tors. 168 Thus, an insider guaranty allows additional pressure to be
brought to bear on the firm's principals during the bankruptcy case, and
it significantly decreases the value of "cramming down" any plan of
reorganization under which they retain value without the consent of the
guarantied creditor.
Chapter 11 is a bargaining process, it might be argued, and the
insider guaranty simply shifts the parameters within which the debtor
and creditors bargain. There is nothing sacrosanct about bargaining sans
guaranty. If the insiders truly bring value to the enterprise, as they often
do, and have few outside assets, the creditor may be induced to release
the personal guaranties in exchange for a payout from the reorganized
debtor that exceeds the liquidation dividend available if the insiders
walk away plus the recovery available if they are sued on their guaran-
ties. Moreover, guarantors with few assets have a credible response to
creditor pressure - personal bankruptcy.
This natural response misses a crucial point, however. The insider
guaranty not only changes the balance of leverage between the parties, it
also changes the nature of the bargaining, by removing cramdown as a
viable threat. 169 Assume for the moment that it is efficient to reorganize
164. See Baird & Picker, supra note 123, at 121; Kordana & Posner, supra note 85, at 193-96.
165. See Kordana & Posner, supra note 85, at 182-90.
166. See id. at 173-82; LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control, supra note 70, at 257.
167. See Baird & Picker, supra note 123, at 320-24.
168. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119, 120 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Nothing
in § 362 suggests that Congress intended that provision to strip from the creditors of a bankrupt
debtor the protection they sought and received when they required a third party to guaranty the
debt.").
169. See, e.g., Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW. 441 (1984) (arguing that cramdown is "used more as a threat
[to induce settlement] than as a club actually employed in confirming a plan of reorganization");
Jack Friedman, What Courts Do To Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down, 14 CARuozo L.
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the firm. The firm is most likely in bankruptcy because a bargaining
impasse between the firm and its major creditor(s) prevented an out-of-
court workout. Absent the guaranty (or if the guarantor is solvent),
insiders have two bargaining strategies they can use to try to reach a
consensual resolution in the bankruptcy case: They can threaten either
liquidation or cramdown. The threat of cramdown generally requires a
demonstration of commitment to the business and strong indications that
reorganization is possible. The creditor must believe that the insiders
are willing to commit "new value" to the company in order to reorganize
over the creditor's objection. To make a liquidation threat credible,
however, the insider may have to act in precisely the opposite manner in
order to demonstrate that the insider considers the business expendable.
A liquidation threat may require insiders to openly devote time to alter-
natives (like searching for or even taking new jobs, or starting a new
company) to demonstrate their willingness to let the company die. It is
not hard to picture failure as an outcome when each side is saying to the
other, "Give in, or I'll liquidate the company!" Creditors always
threaten liquidation; if insiders have no alternative but to threaten liqui-
dation as well, the negotiations will involve a level of brinkmanship that
may lead to the failure of the firm even though a cramdown threat, were
one available, might have led to a consensual reorganization.
D. Conclusions
The insider guaranty is not just a contract of financial assurance,
providing the creditor with an additional source of recovery should the
borrower default. It is a screening, bonding, and control device intended
to align shareholder and managerial incentives with the interests of the
guarantied creditor. To the extent that it improves over other methods
addressing the financial agency problem, it can be expected to lower
borrowing costs for small firms. Anything that interferes with the lever-
age granted to a creditor by an insider guaranty threatens these benefits.
As a result, caution is appropriate in considering any bankruptcy rules
that might impair the functioning of insider guaranties. On the other
hand, there are situations where an insider guaranty may create inappro-
priate incentives. The question is whether bankruptcy law is capable of
reducing the costs of these situations without causing greater harm than
good. Part IV attempts to provide some guidance on that question by
considering two important issues raised by insider guaranties in bank-
ruptcy, using the agency theory framework developed above.
REv. 1495, 1497 (1993) (noting that "[flear of [cramdown] causes parties to settle rather than
litigate in the great majority of cases").
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IV. APPLICATIONS
The analysis provided in Part I can help us make appropriate deci-
sions when legal rules are forced to confront the mixed nature-finan-
cial assurance and creditor leverage-of the insider guaranty. The
following sections apply the framework developed above to two critical
issues in the treatment of insider guaranties in bankruptcy. First, con-
sider the "insider preference" or "Deprizio" problem: Under the
Deprizio doctrine, payments made to a creditor who holds an insider
guaranty are considered payments for the benefit of the insider. Accord-
ingly, they are subject to the one year preference period for insiders,
rather than the ninety day preference period for general creditors. This
doctrine quickly became a lightning rod for commentary and Congres-
sional lobbying, and has been the primary context in which insider guar-
anties have been scrutinized. An agency cost analysis of the
Congressional "fix" adopted in 1994 to mollify lenders shows that Con-
gress addressed the problem in a manner that might generously be
described as "poorly conceived."
The second application offered here is of a problem that has yet to
break out into the judicial arena, although we can expect this to change
rapidly come the next recession. "Springing" and "exploding" guaran-
ties-devices that impose personal liability on insiders only if the bor-
rower becomes subject to a bankruptcy proceeding-have become
extremely common during the 1990s. These devices can be challenged
on numerous grounds, including breach of fiduciary duties and violation
of fundamental bankruptcy policies. As shown below, these devices are
far more troubling than insider guaranties in general (and even more
troubling than explicit waivers of a firm's right to file for bankruptcy),
and should not be enforced by the courts.
A. Preference Law: The Deprizio Debate
The primary objection to insider guaranties appears to be the pref-
erence concern: that the insider will direct funds to the guarantied credi-
tor as bankruptcy looms on the horizon. The prospect of such
preferential payments raises two different objections: (1) that such pay-
ments will reduce the total amount available to the firm's creditors; or
(2) that such payments will unfairly benefit one creditor at the expense
of others. 17
0
170. These are the two concerns that lie at the heart of preference law.
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to
avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy,
creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor
during his slide into bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often
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The problem is easy enough to see. Consider once more the hypo-
thetical presented in Part II.A.,171 but assume that the insider has guaran-
tied $50 of the firm's $100 debt. If the firm is reorganized to realize,
say, $80 in going-concern value for creditors, shared pro-rata, the guar-
antor will face $10 in residual liability on the guaranty.1 72 However, if
the guarantied creditor is able to levy on the firm's assets before the
other creditors, then this creditor will be paid in full and the guarantor's
liability will be extinguished, leaving only $20 (of the $70 piecemeal
value) available to the other unsecured creditors. Thus, the insider guar-
anty may create an incentive for the guarantor to collude in an inefficient
dismemberment if the proceeds can be directed to the guarantied obliga-
tion. The result is both unfair (viewed from a baseline entitlement of pro
rata sharing) and inefficient.
The primary occasion for debate about the relationship between
preference law and insider guaranties has been the Deprizio doctrine.
To provide a brief overview: Absent certain defenses outside our current
concern, a payment to a creditor is a preference, and can be recovered by
the debtor, if the payment is made (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) on account of a preexisting debt; (3) while the debtor is insolvent; (4)
within ninety days before the bankruptcy filing; and (5) if the payment
allows the creditor to receive more than the creditor would have
received if the payment had not been made and the debtor were liqui-
dated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 173 Thus, payments to
unsecured or undersecured creditors, made within ninety days of bank-
ruptcy, may be avoidable.1 74
If the payment is to or for the benefit of a creditor who is an
"insider" of the debtor, the preference period is extended to a full year
enables him to work his way out of a difficult financial situation through
cooperation with all of his creditors. Second, and more important, the preference
provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among
creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater payment than others of
his class is required to disgorge so that all may share equally.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
172. That is, the $80 going-concern value will be split evenly, paying $40 on the guarantied
debt and $40 on the unguarantied debt.
173. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1999).
174. Payments to fully secured creditors generally are not avoidable as preferences because a
fully secured creditor would be paid in full in a Chapter 7 proceeding, although it is possible for a
payment to a fully secured creditor to be an indirect preference. See, e.g., Pitts, supra note 9, at
356-57 (payment to fully secured creditor may be deemed for the benefit of an undersecured
creditor with a lien on the same collateral; under section 550(a), payment could be recovered from
either creditor); but see 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 550,02[5], at 550-15 (15th ed. 1990)
(arguing that recovery from the fully secured creditor should not be permitted).
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before the bankruptcy. 75 Under the "Deprizio doctrine,"'176 a payment
on a debt guarantied by an insider was deemed to be "to or for the bene-
fit of a creditor... [who] at the time of such transfer was an insider,"' 177
and was therefore subject to the full one-year preference period. 178
Moreover, this preference could be recovered either from the guarantor
or from the creditor itself.1 79  Thus, an insider guaranty could actually
harm the lender if the debtor filed for bankruptcy by making it possible
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1999). Although there is no bright-line definition of
insider, it includes officers, directors, general partners, or relatives of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C.
§101(31) (1999). Because the definition of insider is not exclusive, it is possible to argue that, on
the facts in a given case, a creditor had such extensive control over the debtor that the creditor had
become an "insider" in its own right. The case law, however, has generally permitted a substantial
exercise of control by creditors without deeming those creditors to have become insiders, and
certainly more than is exercised merely by threatening enforcement of an insider's guaranty. See,
e.g., Carlson v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Newcomb), 744 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1984) ("It is
conceivable that a creditor could become so involved in the day-to-day business of a debtor as to
become an insider. However, the mere fact that a large creditor has 'control' over the debtor, in
the sense that the creditor can compel payment of a debt, does not make the creditor an insider.");
Gray v. Giant Wholesale Corp., 758 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that creditor who
controlled dispensation of debtor's checks was not an insider).
176. Named after the case that made the issue prominent, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In
re Deprizio Constr. Corp), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The basic reasoning - that a payment
to a creditor may be avoided as a preference because it is a payment for the benefit of an insider
- pre-dates the current Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Smith v. Totstevin, 247 F. 102 (2d Cir.
1917) (holding that payment to bank was voidable as preference to debtor's wife, who had
pledged collateral to secure the loan); Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.
1972) (holding transfer preferential where benefit accrued to debtor's president).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1-4) (1999).
178. See, e.g., Galloway v. First Ala. Bank (In re Wesley Indus., Inc.), 30 F.3d 1438 (1 1th
Cir.1994); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. U.S. Nat'l Bank (In re Sufolla, Inc.), 2 F.3d
977 (9th Cir. 1993); T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. FDIC (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 950 F.2d
1187 (5th Cir. 1992); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th
Cir. 1990); Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th
Cir. 1989); In re Deprizio Constr. Corp., 874 F.2d at 1186; see also Traveler's Ins. v. Cambridge
Meridian Group, Inc., (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992) (declining to
decide the issue, but assuming Deprizio was correct for purposes of the decision); Southmark
Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993)
(agreeing with Deprizio rule provided insider received more than an incidental benefit from
transfer). But see, e.g., Hovis v. Powers Constr. Co. (In re Hoffman Assocs., Inc.), 179 B.R. 797
(Bankr. D. S.C. 1995); H & C Partnership v. Virginia Serv. Merchandisers, Inc., 164 B.R. 527
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1994); Performance Communications, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Performance Communications, Inc.), 126 B.R. 473 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); Official Creditors'
Comm. of Arundel Hous. Components, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (In re Arundel Hous.
Components, Inc.), 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. Chemical
Bank (In re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc.), 119 B.R. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Goldberger v. Davis Jay
Corrugated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indus.), 37 B.R. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Bakst v.
Schilling (In re Cove Patio, Inc.), 19 B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
179. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1999). This provision governs the recovery of an avoided transfer,
and section 550(a) provides, in relevant part, that an avoided transfer may be recovered from "(1)
the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made .. "
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
for the debtor to recover payments that had been made to the lender
between ninety days and one year before the filing.
The Deprizio decision elicited a tremendous response. The lending
community reacted with loud expressions of shock and outrage, pro-
testing that the decision was unreasonable and unfair.1 80 Commentators
defended 181 or attacked' 82 the decision. While the precise theory on
which insider preferences should be condemned has often been disputed,
the common explanation is that it is unfair to permit insiders to use their
superior information regarding the firm's affairs to advantage them-
selves at the expense of other creditors. 83 Few, if any, of Deprizio's
critics disagreed with this sentiment. Rather, they responded that it was
unfair to "punish" the "innocent" lender for its prudence in taking a
guaranty.1 84
180. Indeed, prior to the Deprizio decision, a number of courts had rejected the extension of
the preference period as applied to an outside creditor holding an insider guaranty, citing equitable
concerns. See, e.g., Block v. Texas Commerce Bank N.A. (In re Midwestern Cos.), 96 B.R. 224
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102 B.R. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Aerco Metals, Inc. 60 B.R.
77 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1985); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 B.R. 888
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); Seeley v. Church Bldgs. and Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldgs. and
Interiors, Inc.), 14 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcY
550.02 (15th ed. 1990) (disagreeing with Deprizio-type reasoning on grounds that it would permit
recovery from a party innocent of wrongdoing and deserving protection).
181. See, e.g., Tom Lane, Recovery of Avoidable Transfers from the "Initial Transferee"
Under Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 COM. L.J. 457 (1991) (supporting
Deprizio); Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response
to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW. 2151 (1990) (defending the policy basis, but not technical reasoning, of
Deprizio); Pitts, supra note 9 (advocating the reading of section 550(a) that was later adopted in
Deprizio); Dix, note, supra note 101.
182. See, e.g., Donald W. Baker, Repayments of Loans Guaranteed by Insiders as Avoidable
Preferences in Bankruptcy: Deprizio and Its Aftermath, 23 U.C.C. L.J. 115 (1990) (arguing that
Deprizio is unsound and should be reconsidered); Robert F. Higgins & David E. Peterson, Is
There a One-Year Preference Period for Non-Insiders?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383 (1990)
(criticizing Deprizio as a mechanical and unfair application of the Bankruptcy Code); John
Stephen Cullina, Comment, Recharacterizing Insider Preferences As Fraudulent Conveyances: A
Different View of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand, 77 VA. L. REv. 149 (1991) (suggesting that the
Bankruptcy Code be amended to recharacterize insider preferences as fraudulent conveyances);
Nussbaum, supra note 9 (same); James A. Rodenberg, Note, Indirect Preferences: Recovery
Under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 55 Mo. L. REv. 327 (1990) (arguing against
the Deprizio doctrine and in favor of flexible approach to the insider preference question); Mark
E. Toth, Comment, The Impossible State of Preference Law Under the Bankruptcy Code: Levit v.
Ingersoll Rand and the Problem of Insider-Guaranteed Debt, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1155.
183. See cases cited by McCoid, supra note 142, at 819-20; WILLIAM A. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §7469 (Timothy P. Bjur & J. Jeffrey
Reinholtz, eds., rev. vol. 1990) ("Generally, the rule prohibiting preferences to directors is not
founded upon the trust fund doctrine, but upon the theory that it is inequitable that directors,
whose knowledge of conditions and power to act for the corporation give them an advantage,
should be permitted to protect their own claims to the detriment of others at a time when it is
apparent that all the unsecured debts of the corporation are equally in peril and that all of them
cannot be paid.").
184. Many cases finding for lenders, prior to the Deprizio decision itself, relied on vague
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With the widespread adoption of the Deprizio reasoning, lenders
found themselves in a quandary. On the one hand, they did not want to
give up the benefits of insider guaranties. On the other hand, they were
seriously troubled by the risk presented by a one-year preference period.
Rather than abandoning insider guaranties - and pending the outcome
of a substantial lobbying effort to have the rule reversed - lenders fast-
ened on a supposed "solution" to the Deprizio problem: having the
insider guarantor waive its rights to recover from the debtor by way of
subrogation or reimbursement for any amounts paid under the guar-
anty. 185 With such a waiver, some courts have held, the insider is not a
"creditor" with respect to the guarantied obligation, and so the payment
does not benefit an insider "creditor" and is not subject to the one-year
preference period.1 86
The effects of the Deprizio doctrine were substantially curtailed by
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.187 Under the Reform Act's amend-
ments to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, if a transfer made between
ninety days and one year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition is
avoided as a preference because it was made for the benefit of a creditor
who was an insider, the payment may not be recovered from a transferee
incantations of the "inequity" of applying the extended preference period to an outside creditor.
See, e.g., In re Performance Communications, Inc., 126 B.R. 473, 477 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding that it would be inequitable for the lender to suffer for its prudence); In re Aerco Metals,
Inc., 60 B.R. 77, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (stating that the law should not "punish the Bank for
[its] prudence"); In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (stating
that it would be inequitable to "penalize" bank for its prudence); see also COLLiER, supra note
174, 550.02.
185. See, e.g., In re Northeastern Contracting Co., 187 B.R. 420 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995); In re
XTI Xonix Tech., Inc. 156 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993); In re Fastrans, 142 B.R. 241 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1992); Timothy R. Zinnecker, Lawyers Who Draft and Negotiate Guaranties (and the
Clients Who Love Them), 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 387, 401-04 (1994); Borowitz, supra note 181.
186. See, e.g., In re Deprizio Constr. Corp., 874 F.2d at 1191-92; In re Northeastern
Contracting Co., 187 BR 420 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995); In re XTI Xonix Tech., Inc., 156 BR 821
(Bankr. D. Or. 1993); In re Fastrans, Inc., 142 BR 241 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). Professor
Westbrook has argued that such waivers should be held unenforceable, but no court has yet held
them so. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 88; see also Covey v. Northwest
Community Bank (In re Helen Gallagher Enter., Inc.), 126 B.R. 997 (Bankr. C.D. 1I. 1991)
(suggesting, in dicta, that reimbursement waiver may be unenforceable). The requirement that
there be a nexus between the guaranty and the insider's status as a creditor has been criticized on
both technical and policy grounds. See, e.g., Borowitz, supra note 181, at 2156 (arguing that a
waiver of subrogation rights only increases the incentive for the guarantor to prefer the creditor
whose obligation he guarantied); David L. Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550:
Extended Preference Exposure via Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils of Initial Transferee
Liability, 45 Bus. LAW. 511, 530-51 (1990) (same); Given, Lenders Gunned Down in Gangland
Killing - Preferences After Deprizio, FALKNER & GRAY's BANKR. L. REV., Winter 1990, 53, 56
(stating that waiver of subrogation rights increases incentive to prefer the guarantied creditor, and
may add merit to the contention that the payment is a fraudulent conveyance made with the intent
to hinder, delay or defraud other creditors).
187. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
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who was not an insider. 88
Note that this amendment does not fully remove the burden
imposed by the Deprizio rule. It does not change the definition of a
preference, contained in section 547, to eliminate payments made
between ninety days and one year before the bankruptcy filing on obli-
gations guarantied by an insider. These payments are still avoidable
preferences and can still be recovered from the insider guarantor. Under
section 550(c), however, they can no longer be recovered from the
creditor.
Although the estate cannot recover these payments from the credi-
tor, the creditor may still suffer various ill effects from the fact that these
payments fall within the definition of preferential transfers. For exam-
ple, section 502(d) provides that the court shall disallow the claims of
any party who is a transferee of an avoidable transfer unless the party
has returned the transfer.1 89 Thus, if the guarantor cannot or does not
repay the preference, the creditor's claims against the estate may be dis-
allowed. Moreover, if the preferential transfer was the granting of a lien
to the creditor to secure a preexisting debt, then the transfer can still be
avoided under section 547 (voiding the lien); the proscription in section
550(c) does not apply because the estate has no need to recover anything
from the creditor under section 550(a). ° To avoid these problems,
many lenders continue to insist upon subrogation and reimbursement
waivers from their insider guarantors notwithstanding the 1994 amend-
ments that supposedly reversed the Deprizio doctrine.
As can be seen from this short recital, the preference analysis of
debts secured by insider guaranties has received a great deal of atten-
tion.19 By and large, however, the analysis has taken place at an histor-
ical and doctrinal level, supplemented with ad hoc judgments about the
coercive effects of guaranties. In analyzing the preference issues, little
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1999). The 1994 amendments added section 550(c), as follows:
If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition -
(1) is avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and (2) was made for the benefit of
a creditor that at the time of such transfer was an insider; the trustee may not recover
under subsection (a) from a transferee that is not an insider.
189. Section 502(d) provides in relevant part that
the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable
under section ... 550 ... of this title, or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable
under section ... 547 ... of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the
amount ... for which such entity or transferee is liable. ...
11 U.S.C. §502(d) (1999).
190. See, e.g., Williams v. Assocs. Home Equity Serv., Inc., 1999 WL 388210 (Bankr. D. Or.
1999) (holding that the preferential transfer of a lien may be avoided under section 547 without
invoking the recovery provisions of section 550).
191. See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 142, at 806 ("Because no unified approach to the problem
exists, the courts have reached conflicting results in insider preference cases.").
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or no effort seems to have been made to systematically examine the
functions of the insider guaranty.
Consider an oft-cited exchange between two highly respected com-
mercial law scholars, Professors Jay Westbrook and Peter Alces. 192 Pro-
fessor Westbrook argued that the commentary on Deprizio had generally
overlooked two essential points, one of which was "the distinction
between insider guarantees taken for their economic value, because the
insider has the wherewithal to pay the debt, and those that are purely a
matter of pressure on the insider to misdirect the debtor's funds." 19 3
Professor Alces responded in part that this dichotomy was unrealistic,
because all guaranties are a mixture, intended to accomplish both func-
tions to greater or lesser degrees. 194 What both points of view share is
an assumption that the leverage aspect of an insider guaranty is gener-
ally improper or illegitimate. 195 They focus on the creditor's ability to
use its leverage to compel preferential treatment, minimizing the broader
functions and benefits offered by insider guaranties. 19 6
Professor Westbrook notes approvingly that Deprizio will discour-
age lenders from taking "pure leverage" guaranties, meaning that the
guarantor does not have wealth to make payment on the guaranty and
the purpose of the guaranty is simply to provide leverage to the creditor
to secure a preferential payment. 197 What Professor Westbrook does not
explain is why the preferential effect of this creditor leverage - to the
extent that it exists against an impecunious guarantor 198 - will exceed
192. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122; Peter A. Alces, Rethinking Professor
Westbrook's Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 77 MINN. L. Rav. 605 (1993) [hereinafter
Alces, Rethinking]; Westbrook, Clear Thinking, supra note 101; Peter A. Alces, Clearer
Conceptions of Insider Preferences, 71 WASH. U.L.Q. (1993) [hereinafter Alces, Clearer
Conceptions].
193. Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 74.
194. Alces, Rethinking, supra note 192, at 621-23
195. Neither completely ignores this fact. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at
84 n.46 (discussing, in a footnote, the way an insider guaranty may induce a guarantor to assist in
an efficient liquidation of the debtor); Alces, Clearer Conceptions, supra note 192, at 1110-11
(noting the commitment aspect of the guaranty). Yet neither appears to consider it a significant
element of the analysis, repeatedly seeming to assume that the only relevant function of leverage
is to secure a preferential payment should the debtor get into financial trouble.
196. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 80-81 ("[T]he value of this sort of
guarantee to the lender lies almost completely in the exercise of precisely the sort of pressure the
anti-dismemberment policy is designed to prevent.").
197. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 80-81, 85.
198. Professor Alces questions whether a guaranty can pressure an insider who lacks assets to
pay on that guaranty. Alces, Rethinking, supra note 192, at 616-18. Professor Westbrook
suggests that "the leverage on a pure-leverage guarantor must consist of either the threat to seize
assets of great personal value to the insider, but of little intrinsic value, or the threat of being
forced into personal bankruptcy. Both aspects of the pure-leverage guarantee are in terrorem
pressures that are generally regarded as quasi-legitimate at best." Westbrook, Two Thoughts,
supra note 122, at 82.
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its beneficial effects. If insider guaranties are primarily a means of
screening borrowers, reducing agency costs, and ensuring the insider's
commitment to the business,' 99 then Deprizio, if it discouraged the tak-
ing of such guaranties, could have significant economic costs.
Moreover, Professor Westbrook's expectation that Deprizio would
discourage "leverage" guaranties but not "true" guaranties might have
been accurate had courts agreed with him that reimbursement waivers
should be held unenforceable. 2" However, because the courts seem to
have rejected this suggestion, lenders can continue to take leverage guar-
anties; they just have to change the form contracts they use. Indeed, the
insider's motivation to cause the debtor to pay the guarantied creditor
ahead of others is increased by a reimbursement waiver because pay-
ment by the debtor is the only way for the guarantor to avoid bearing the
ultimate liability.2 10 If these waivers are enforceable, as it appears they
are, then one of Professor Westbrook's primary bases for supporting the
extended preference period (that it will discourage leverage guaranties)
is lost.
An agency theory approach to insider guaranties provides separate
and distinct bases for supporting the Deprizio rule and opposing the
creditor protection granted by Congress under section 550(c). As dis-
cussed above, an insider guaranty may improve the incentives for man-
agement to make efficient investment decisions in or near insolvency.20 2
The Deprizio extension of the preference period on payments to the
guarantied creditor is one means of preserving these beneficial incentive
effects. If the guaranty leads the firm to repay the guarantied debt
between ninety days and one year before the filing and that payment
cannot be recovered from either the creditor or the guarantor, then the
benefits of converting the managing equity holder into a creditor are
lost. If the payment can be recovered, however, then the insider will
want to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate in order to mini-
mize its guaranty liability. Thus, the extension of the preference period
seems to further the monitoring and bonding aspects of the insider guar-
anty, benefitting the entire estate.
If section 550(c) renders the payment unrecoverable from the credi-
tor, and if the guarantor lacks the funds to repay the preferential pay-
ment (a situation that is probably not uncommon), these benefits will be
lost. Without section 550(c), recovery from the guarantied creditor
would likely be available, and would restore the incentive effects identi-
199. See supra Part lI.B.
200. Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 81.
201. See Alces, Rethinking, supra note 192, at 626.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 95-127.
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fled above.2°3
Section 550(c) may drive a wedge between the interests of the
insider and the interests of other creditors in a second way. If the insider
lacks the funds to repay the avoided transfer, then not only is the insider
not a creditor on account of the reimbursement claim for the guarantied
debt (because the insider has not paid that debt),204 but any other claims
held by the insider will also be disallowed, under section 502(d). But it
is desirable for the insider creditor to hold general claims against the
estate because they provide an enhanced incentive to maximize the
return to creditors.20 5
If section 550(c) can be criticized for protecting guarantied credi-
tors too much, it can also be criticized for protecting them too little. An
agency analysis supports Professor Westbrook in objecting to the effects
of reimbursement waivers, because such waivers diminish the incentive
alignment effects of the insider guaranty. Recall that under a traditional
insider guaranty, the beneficial incentive effects exist both before pay-
ment (because the guarantor wants to reduce its liability) and after pay-
ment (because the guarantor wants to maximize its recovery on its
subrogation or reimbursement claim against the debtor). 206 However, if
the guarantor has waived its right to recover from the debtor for pay-
ments made on the guaranty, then the incentive benefits of the guaran-
tor's residual claimant status are lost once the guarantor pays the
creditor. Thus, reimbursement waivers reduce the ability of the guaranty
to mitigate perverse prebankruptcy incentives.2 7 For this reason, the
changes made by the 1994 amendments would probably be beneficial if
they induced creditors to drop the demand that guarantors waive their
reimbursement rights. Because the 1994 Amendments only partially
undid the Deprizio reasoning, however, and lenders still suffer potential
risks from the extended preference period,208 lenders are continuing to
203. If the insider does not have the assets to repay the preference, then the insider may not
have much at risk on its guaranty, and thus the incentive alignment will be less than perfect. The
guaranty, however, is still likely to improve incentives to some extent.
204. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(l)(B) (1999) (disallowing any claim for reimbursement or
contribution by a guarantor if that claim is still contingent as of the time of allowance or
disallowance).
205. See supra Part III.A.
206. See supra Part IIl.C.
207. It could be argued that the willingness of creditors to continue to take insider guaranties
with the indemnification waiver indicates that the incentive alignment effects identified above are
not the motivating force behind insider guaranties. I believe this overstates the case. Rather, it
appears that creditors would prefer a guaranty with a waiver to no guaranty at all. This makes
sense, considering that the guaranty with waiver of reimbursement still provides both bonding and
screening functions, albeit less robustly, as well as an additional potential source of repayment.
208. See supra text accompanying note 190.
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seek these waivers, and some of the value of insider guaranties is being
lost.
Moreover, if the insider guaranty is intended to provide an incen-
tive for the equity holders to maximize the value of the firm in periods
of financial distress, a central means of doing this may be through an
out-of-court restructuring. The extended preference period has been
criticized as being inimical to workouts, because payments or security
offered to a guarantied creditor as part of a restructuring will be avoided
in any bankruptcy filed within a full year. Thus, lenders may hesitate to
enter into restructurings.2"9 Viewed another way, by extending the pref-
erence period, the insider guaranty may create an opportunity for a
debtor to file for bankruptcy simply to avoid concessions previously
made to a guarantied lender. The concern for consensual restructurings
appears consistent with the basic thrust of section 550(c): holding the
insider liable for recovery of the preference, but not the lender. Properly
implemented, this scheme would allow the lender to make concessions
toward a workout without fear of extended liability. It would also dis-
courage the insider from making concessions with the debtor's assets to
avoid liability on the guaranty, because the insider knows it may be held
liable for the recovery of those concessions. Unfortunately, section
550(c) falls short of offering this type of protection to workouts, because
many concessions that would be made to a lender during the extended
preference period (such as new or additional liens) are still subject to
avoidance under section 547.
In short, the protection of creditors under Section 550(c) appears to
be the worst of all possible worlds. The Code now prohibits recovery of
the preferential transfer from the party most likely to be able to pay.
This reduces the beneficial incentive effects of the insider guaranty.
Section 550(c) will often damage shareholder incentives further by lead-
ing to the disallowance of insider's claims under section 502(d). And
because Congress chose to address the problem through the recovery
provision rather than by modifying the definition of a preferential trans-
fer in section 547, workouts will still be discouraged and lenders will
still insist on reimbursement waivers, further damaging the positive
incentive effects of insider guaranties.
B. Springing and Exploding Guaranties
1. BACKGROUND
If the Deprizio debate was the first issue to put a spotlight on
209. This argument was raised in the Deprizio opinion itself but the court discounted it,
writing, "the fear of bankruptcy replacing some workouts does not lead us to shy away from an
ordinary reading of the statute." In re Deprezio Constr. Corp., 874 F.2d at 1198.
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insider guaranties, we can now see the outlines of the second: "spring-
ing" and "exploding" guaranties. A springing guaranty is a guaranty of
an enterprise's debt, given by an insider, which will become effective
only upon specified conditions.21° Typically, those conditions include
the filing of a bankruptcy case by the borrower or failure to have any
involuntary bankruptcy case quickly dismissed. An exploding guaranty
is the mirror image, a guaranty that is in effect but will become void if
the borrower cooperates with the lender after any default. The effect is
the same: The insider will be personally liable for the debt if the bor-
rower contests the lender's rights or remedies, or files a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, after default. The insider will be free from liability if the
borrower "rolls over" and lets the lender enforce its remedies without a
contest.211
These devices (hereinafter referred to as "bankruptcy-contingent
guaranties") were developed in the early 1990s and have rapidly become
210. For sample documents, see WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1981), Form § 1111:2 (non-recourse provision with carve-out for bankruptcy
proceedings); Lester M. Biwise, Mortgage Lending Documentation, Attachment C ("Model
Springing Guaranty"), in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 9, 61 (PLI Real Est. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-4603, 1997) (although entitled a "Springing Guaranty,"
this is actually a terminable or "exploding" guaranty); Sidney A. Keyles, Counseling the Client on
Springing and Exploding Guaranties (with Forms), 12 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 29 (Nov. 1996);
MICHAEL T. MADISON AND JEFFRY R. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING (rev. ed.
1996), Forms 14.2 ("Guaranty: Springing") and 14.3 ("Guaranty Agreement: Exploding"); Joshua
Stein, Lender's Model State-of-the-Art Nonrecourse Clause (with Carveouts), 43 PR~c. LAW. 31
(1997).
211. The same effect can be created in nonrecourse lending, which is common in commercial
real estate finance, by creating a "carve-out" from the nonrecourse provisions. See, e.g., ALAN
WAYTE, NON-REcOURSE CLAUSE, reprinted in MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 1575, 1585-
86 (ALI-ABA Resource Materials, 1I ed. 1996) which provides in relevant part:
(d) Notwithstanding the limitation of liability in subsection (a) above, Borrower
shall be fully personally liable for all of Borrower's obligations under the Loan
Documents, and Lender's recourse to the personal assets of Borrower and its
constituent partners shall not be limited in any way by this Section X, if Borrower
(A) attempts to prevent or delay the foreclosure of the Mortgage or any other
collateral for the Loan or the exercise of any of lender's other remedies under any
Loan Document, or (B) claims that any Loan Document is invalid or unenforceable
and such a claims [sic] will have the effect of preventing or delaying such
foreclosure or any other exercise of remedies. Without limitation, Borrower shall be
deemed to have attempted to prevent or delay such foreclosure or other exercise of
remedies if (i) Borrower files a petition under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the "Bankruptcy Code), as amended, (ii) Borrower opposes
a motion by Lender to lift an automatic stay imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362
and for leave to foreclose the Mortgage and any other collateral for the Loan, or (iii)
Borrower files a proposed plan of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code under
which Lender would receive (x) less than all of the Property or (y) a lien
encumbering less than all of the Property or (z) a lien having a lower priority or
terms less favorable to Lender than the Mortgage as it existed immediately prior to
the filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code. ...
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commonplace.212 Although they raise difficult legal and policy issues,
the strength of the economy through the 1990s has generally prevented
lenders from having to enforce them, and so there is, as of yet, little case
law on their enforceability. 3
Bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are the clearest example of
"pure-leverage guaranties. '2 4  Their function is not to assure an addi-
tional means of repayment of the debt should the borrower default.
Rather, they ensure that the borrower will make every effort to live up to
its contractual promises and will not hamper the creditor in its efforts to
enforce its rights and recover its debt. Bankruptcy-contingent guaranties
are most widely used in three contexts. First, they may be used in
financing for closely-held businesses, where a single or small number of
shareholders, members, or partners own and control the borrower. Sec-
ond, they are used in commercial real estate lending.2 ' Third, they are
increasingly common as an adjunct to creating "bankruptcy remote"
entities in securitized financing transactions.
The challenges to bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are likely to
come from several different directions. There will be arguments that
they are unenforceable as a matter of state law because they violate pub-
212. While conversations with practitioners confirm that bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are
now a standard part of commercial transactions, there is no real data on the prevalence of these
devices. Indeed, to the extent a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty serves its purpose, there never
will be a judicial record of its existence. Some indication of the growth of the bankruptcy-
contingent guaranty may be found in the secondary literature. There are no references to
springing or exploding guaranties in the WESTLAW TP-ALL database (all texts and periodicals)
prior to 1996; four in 1996; six in 1997; 10 in 1998; and ten in the first half of 2000. Only in the
last three or four years have form books started including bankruptcy-contingent guaranties. See
sources cited supra note 210.
213. See infra at Part IV.B.2 (discussing cases on bankruptcy-contingent nonrecourse carve-
outs).
214. The term is borrowed from Professor Westbrook, but note an important difference from
the context in which he used it - to refer to any insider guarantee from a guarantor who is " not
likely to be able to offset any shortfall in the debtor's performance." See Westbrook, Two
Thoughts, supra note 122, at 80. Here, the point is that, regardless of whether or not the guarantor
is solvent, the entire purpose of the guaranty is to control behavior rather than to provide
additional financial resources.
215. See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Nonrecourse Carveouts: How Far is Far Enough?, REAL EST.
REV. (Summer 1997); Frederick Z. Lodge, et al., Bankruptcy Remote Structures in Mortgage
Loans, PROB. & PROP., June 10, 1996, 49 Russell L. Munsch, et al., The Changing Commercial
Real Estate Environment - Are Commercial Real Estate Workouts Dead?, (Dallas Bar Ass'n, Nov.
5, 1997) (visited June 1999), available in <http://www.munsch.com/hottopics/environmentl.
html> ("The standardization of commercial real estate loan documentation nationwide, as well as
structured impediments to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and bankruptcy cases
(including the proliferation of 'springing guaranties'), may adversely impact upon the willingness
or ability of commercial real estate owners to seek the protection of these forums."); Kenneth M.
Block & Jeffery B. Steiner, Stays of 'Springing Guaranties': How Creditor Can Enforce Rights
Against Non-Debtor Guarantor, N.Y .L.J., July 17, 1996, at 5 (stating that springing guaranties
"are common in real estate loans and financings").
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lic policy. They will be challenged in bankruptcy cases, where debtors
and guarantors will seek temporary and permanent injunctions against
their enforcement. These attacks will go beyond the guarantor's liabil-
ity, as debtors seek to have lenders' claims equitably subordinated on
account of the leverage created by the guaranty. In the following sec-
tions, I review the sparse caselaw on springing and exploding guaranties,
then examine the fiduciary duty and bankruptcy policy arguments
against their enforcement.
2. CASE LAW
Only two reported cases address bankruptcy-contingent guaranties,
with each case structured as a nonrecourse carve-out in a real estate
mortgage. Both found the guaranties enforceable. Consider first the
Fourth Circuit's decision in FDIC v. Prince George Corp.216 After fore-
closure, the FDIC sued a joint venturer for a deficiency judgment on the
joint venture's nonrecourse mortgage note. The nonrecourse clause had
a carve-out providing that the note would become recourse "to the extent
that Holder's rights of recourse to the property which is then subject to
the Mortgage are suspended, reduced, or impaired by or as a result of
any act, omission or misrepresentation . . . or by or as a result of any
case, action, suit or proceeding to which [the borrower or any other lia-
ble party] voluntarily becomes a party. '2 17 In essence, the carve-out was
a springing guaranty by the joint venturers.
The district court held that the borrower's bankruptcy filing was an
"act" triggering liability under this provision, but for "policy reasons",
the court declined to hold that the borrower's actions in resisting the
foreclosure itself gave rise to liability.218 The court stated that if the
"lender intended to use the threat of a deficiency judgment as an incen-
tive to induce PGC to give up its right to defend against foreclosure,
such an extreme position should have been more clearly stated."2 9 The
district court thus awarded damages based on the sixty-three days by
which foreclosure had been delayed by the borrower's bankruptcy
filing.22°
On appeal, the guarantor argued that the borrower had a statutory
right to bankruptcy protection and that any waiver of that right was void
on public policy grounds.221 The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument,
noting that the contract "did not prohibit PGC from resorting to bank-
216. 58 F.3d 1041 (4th Cir. 1995).
217. Id. at 1044.
218. See id. at 1045.
219. See id. at 1047.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1046.
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ruptcy; it merely provided that if PGC took certain actions it would for-
feit its exemption from liability for any deficiency." '222 Moreover, the
court held that the unambiguous language imposed deficiency liability
for "any act" that impaired the lender's recourse rights, language that
includes the borrower's defense of the foreclosure proceeding.223 The
Fourth Circuit therefore remanded for a determination of liability based
on the delays caused by both the bankruptcy case and the borrower's
defense of the foreclosure action.
The second case that considers springing guaranties is similar. In
First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs.,22 4 the debtor real
estate partnership had entered into a nonrecourse mortgage with a carve-
out providing that the partners would be individually liable should the
partnership ever file for bankruptcy. After default, the partnership filed
for bankruptcy, although the case was later dismissed. The lender then
sued the partners, who argued that the bankruptcy-contingent liability
was unenforceable under the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition of ipso
facto clauses.225 The court rejected this argument on numerous grounds,
including the facts that the ipso facto prohibition applies only to execu-
tory contracts, not mortgages, and that once the bankruptcy cases had
been dismissed, the enforceability of the agreement was a matter of state
law rather than bankruptcy law.226
While both of these cases enforced bankruptcy-contingent liabili-
ties, they should provide little comfort to lenders. In each case, the
bankruptcy proceeding had been dismissed prior to the initiation of the
guaranty suit, making these poor candidates to test the robustness of
springing guaranties in the face of a strong bankruptcy policy argument.
Moreover, both cases were single-asset realty cases, meaning that the
borrowers had few, if any, creditors other than the mortgagee. As a
result, state law fiduciary duties that might have been owed to creditors
were not relevant either. In other words, these were the easy cases, to
which the arguments against bankruptcy-contingent guaranties do not
readily apply.
3. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Perhaps the most obvious argument against springing and explod-
ing guaranties - on appropriate facts227 - is that they are intended to
create a conflict between the guarantor's self-interest and the fiduciary
222. Id.
223. See id. at 1048.
224. 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1999).
226. See Brookhaven Realty, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
227. This argument is factually inapposite in single asset real estate cases like Prince George
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duties owed to all of the borrower's creditors as the borrower becomes
insolvent. From this observation, it would seem only a small step to the
conclusion that bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are unenforceable.
Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort, and it is elementary contract law that
an agreement intended to induce the commission of a tort violates public
policy and is not enforceable. 228  This argument does not rely on the
Bankruptcy Code or bankruptcy policy. It simply asserts that a spring-
ing or exploding guaranty is not enforceable as a matter of state law.
This is consistent with the traditional view of the duties of corpo-
rate directors. Courts have routinely held that contracts limiting the abil-
ity of corporate directors to exercise their independent judgment are
unenforceable.2 29 While this argument may prevail in some jurisdic-
tions, the general victory of the contractarian view of fiduciary duties is
likely, in many cases (depending on the jurisdiction and the type of busi-
ness entity involved), to prevent it from applying. The law of business
organizations now largely eschews mandatory terms - even when it
comes to fiduciary duties.2 3° Mandatory terms have been derided as
ineffective, because they can be avoided in many cases by explicit char-
ter or contractual choices,2 31 by organizing in another jurisdiction that
does not impose the same mandatory term,2 32 or by choosing another
Corp. and Brookhaven Realty, where there are few, if any, creditors other than the mortgage
lender asserting the guaranty liability.
228. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 ("A promise to commit a tort or to
induce the commission of a tort is unenforceable on grounds of public policy."). A related
argument that could be made, yet would likely fail, is that the threat to exercise a springing
guaranty violates a fiduciary duty owed by the lender. While it is generally true that a lender owes
no fiduciary duties to its borrowers, to the extent that a creditor is able to exercise control over a
particular decision made by a debtor's board of directors, the creditor may be found to have
fiduciary duties with regard to that decision. See, e.g., Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re
Teltronics), 29 B.R. 139, 170-71 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The general rule that a creditor is not a
fiduciary of his debtor is not without exception. In the rare circumstance where a creditor
exercises such control over the decision-making processes of the debtor as amounts to a
domination of its will, he may be held accountable for his actions under a fiduciary standard.").
229. See, e.g., 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporation § 1487 ("A contract by a director of a corporation
that limits or restricts him in the free exercise of his judgment or discretion, or that places him
under direct and powerful inducements to diregard his duties to the corporation, its creditors, and
other stockholders in the management of corporate affairs, is against public policy and void.")
(citing cases); WiLAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1993) § 4-20 (citing cases).
230. This is a far from settled issue, and the literature addressing the wisdom or folly of
permitting fiduciary duties to be waived in the business setting has become immense. A primary
resource on the debate in the corporate arena is Symposium: Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). A recent round in the debate, focusing on partnership and
other unincorporated entities, can be found in Symposium on the Future of the Unincorporated
Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 387 (1997).
231. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Repose to
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 10 (1990).
232. See id. at 11.
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form of organization.233 They have also been criticized as inefficient,
because they require investors to acquiesce to a relationship whose terms
they do not believe are optimal.234
For the moment, these criticisms seem to have largely carried the
day.235 In New York, for example, the duty of loyalty does not prohibit
self-dealing if the personal interest is disclosed and approved by the dis-
interested directors.236 Delaware has a similar provision.237 In the con-
text of close corporations, courts have applied somewhat higher
standards of loyalty as between majority and minority shareholders,
given the position of dependence that minority shareholders find them-
selves in.238 However, there is no reason to expect these higher stan-
dards to apply when courts consider the fiduciary duties owed by
shareholder managers of an insolvent close corporation to the firm's
creditors. And in some jurisdictions, such as Delaware, the discretion of
board members or managing shareholders in a close corporation may be
modified or controlled by written agreement of a majority of the
shareholders.239
This trend toward waivable fiduciary duties is also apparent in
recent statutory enactments governing noncorporate business entities.
For example, under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1995)
and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994), a partner or manager's
duty of loyalty may not be waived; however, the partnership or operat-
ing agreement may "identify specific types or categories of activities
that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasona-
ble. ' '24° The Uniform Acts, of course, are not binding on the states, and
233. Id.
234. See generally id.
235. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability
Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary
Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company, 51 OKLA. L. Rev.
427 (1998).
A number of state statutes have attempted to create an entity [the limited liability
company] that is entirely a creature of contract and not bound by any mandatory
fiduciary duties whatsoever. Some commentators argue that the abolition of
mandatory fiduciary duties will make LLCs the entity of choice among business
forms, including closely held and publicly traded companies. Indeed, Delaware has
paved the way for this eventuality by removing any obstacles for trading LLCs on
the secondary markets and by explicitly basing its LLC laws on the contractarian
model of the corporation.
Id. at 459 (citations omitted).
236. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(b) (McKinney 1986).
237. See DEL. CODE ANN. Trr. 8, § 144 (1991).
238. See Kathleen D. Fuentes, Comment, Limited Liability Companies and Opting-Out of
Liability: A New Standard for Fiduciary Duties?, 27 SErON HALL. L. REv. 1023, 1043-46 (1997).
239. See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 350-354 (1999).
240. § 103(b)(2)(i) (1995); REviSED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr (R.U.P.A.) § 103(b)(3)(i)
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some states, most notably Delaware, have loosened the restrictions even
further.241
The defense of bankruptcy-contingent guaranties under this con-
tractarian approach is simple enough. The question is whether the
potential conflict is to be viewed from an ex ante perspective, from
which the "conflict" is a deliberate decision by the corporation to bind
its managers to a particular approach to insolvency, or from an ex post
perspective, which examines the situation as a conflict of interest arising
at the point of insolvency. Viewed ex post, the decision to stay out of
bankruptcy may be a breach of the duty of loyalty - unless it is per-
missible for the parties to enter into a defined modification of the duty of
loyalty in specified future circumstances, where that modification is in
the corporation's interest at the time it is executed. What looks like a
conflict of duties at the time of insolvency is really a process for bond-
ing the entity's decision makers to ensure that they will carry out those
acts which, at the time of financing, the entity has determined best
advance its goals.
As a matter of corporate law (but not necessarily bankruptcy law),
this argument seems likely to prevail. While some early cases held that
a director could not enter into a contract that could create a personal
interest in conflict with the director's fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion,24 2 this is no longer the prevailing law. In most states today, a cor-
poration may enter into a contract with a director if a disinterested
quorum and voting majority of directors supports the transaction, or if
the director shows the fairness of the transaction. Conflicts are not per
se impermissible, and if appropriate disinterested parties (directors or a
judge) believe the transaction is in the corporation's interest, there is no
violation.
Put in this light, bankruptcy-contingent guaranties seem unobjec-
tionable. It is hard to argue that an insider is taking advantage of the
firm when he assumes the risk of liability for the firm's debt in order to
(1997). Similarly, the acts provide that the operating agreement may not "unreasonably reduce
the duty of care", § 103(b)(3) (1995) and § 10(b)(4) (1997), nor "eliminate the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing... but the [operating agreement or partnership agreement] may determine
the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are
not manifestly unreasonable." ULLCA § 103(b)(4) (1975); R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(5) (1997).
241. See DEL. CODE § 18-1101(c) (1999), which states
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person has
duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited liability
company or to another member or manager... (2) the member's or manager's or
other person's duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in a
limited liability company agreement.
242. See JAMES D. Cox, et al., COPORATIONS, § 10.12-14.
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secure financing for the firm.243 As one court has said in a different
context, the fiduciary duty of a controlling shareholder "does not require
self-sacrifice." 24
Under modem standards of fiduciary duty, it seems that a springing
or exploding guaranty can be validated by vote of the board or subse-
quent judicial ratification. In some contexts, such as the LLC or partner-
ship setting, the validation may occur through provisions in the
organizing documents.
However, the fact that a manager's fiduciary duties to other equity
holders are contractually defined, modified, or waived does not neces-
sarily settle the extent of the fiduciary duties owed to creditors upon
insolvency. After all, the creditors were not parties to the modification
provision, nor are the shareholders or directors who ratified it the credi-
tors' representatives. Indeed, statutory provisions governing the modifi-
cation of fiduciary duties in the LLC and partnership context explicitly
state that "the partnership [operating] agreement may not . . . (10)
restrict rights of third parties under this [Act]. 245 It is arguable, there-
fore, that even under a contractarian approach to fiduciary duties, the
manager should not be able to enter into a bankruptcy-contingent guar-
anty, which attempts to modify the incentives that will be faced by the
manager at a future time when he or she will owe fiduciary duties to
creditors.246
On closer inspection, however, this argument also begins to lose
243. Most cases addressing conflict of interest situations involve a fiduciary dealing with the
corporation in a manner that results in a personal benefit for the fiduciary. Thus, cases on the
corporate opportunity doctrine or excess compensation or self-dealing are commonplace. In the
bankruptcy-contingent guaranty context, however, the insider does not gain at the expense of the
corporation by entering into the guaranty; thus, most of the existing case law seems inapposite.
The closest analogy is to cases that address whether it is a breach of fiduciary duty for an insider
to cause an insolvent corporation to make payments on a debt owed to, or guarantied by, the
insider. See McCoid, supra note 142, at 816-21 (discussing cases that have addressed whether
such payments are constructively fraudulent or reversible on "equity" grounds). At least these
cases present situations where an insider entered into a contract from which the insider could only
lose in order to benefit the corporation. Courts have held that later actions taken to mitigate the
insider's loss, at the expense of other creditors, could be a breach of fiduciary duties. Bankruptcy-
contingent guaranties would seem to pose an even stronger case for condemnation. The insider
preference cases concern a question that is purely distributional (which creditors will be paid from
a given pool of assets), while the bankruptcy-contingent guaranty may prevent the firm from
maximizing its assets, distributional questions aside.
244. Getty Oil v. Skelly Oil Co, 267 A.2d 883, 888 (Del. 1970).
245. R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(10) (1996); U.L.L.C.A. § 103(b)(7) (1996).
246. I am not addressing the fiduciary duties of the manager of the debtor in possession after a
bankruptcy filing, which are a matter of bankruptcy law, and presumably cannot be modified by a
pre-bankruptcy contractual arrangement. Moreover, the argument against springing and
exploding guaranties is not that they subvert the management of the bankruptcy case because once
the guarantor has "bitten the bullet" and caused the borrower to file for bankruptcy, the guaranty,
if enforceable, is indistinguishable from an ordinary insider guaranty. The threat from contingent
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some of its strength. Fiduciary duties run to the creditors upon insol-
vency because they become the residual claimants. 247 This is not true if
the borrower's primary debt has been guarantied by its equity holders.
If an insider has guarantied the borrower's primary debt, the insider
remains one of the primary residual claimants until the guarantied debt
is repaid.248
Nonetheless, an insider subject to a springing guaranty faces a basic
conflict of interest, and should therefore have to excuse herself from
voting on whether the firm should file for bankruptcy. While the fact
that the insider is also in the position of residual claimant mitigates the
conflict to some extent, it does not make the director disinterested. If
the insider does not abstain, then it is likely that the insider could be held
liable for breach of fiduciary duty absent a showing of the fairness of the
decision made.
4. BANKRUPTCY POLICY
As noted in Part III.B., insider guaranties can help create appropri-
ate incentives to keep firms from filing unwarranted bankruptcy cases.
This is also the purpose of a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty. It might
even seem that the contingent guaranty, through its tailored structure,
would be superior to an unconditional guaranty. The bankruptcy-contin-
gent guaranty, however, is less accurate in its incentives than an uncon-
ditional guaranty, creating an inappropriate overdeterrence.
Consider once again our hypothetical firm, with a liquidation value
of $70 and a reorganization value of $80.249 The firm has $100 in
unsecured debt, $50 of which has been protected with a springing guar-
anty and $50 of which is not guarantied. Clearly the firm should be
reorganized, in which case creditors will lose only $20 rather than $30.
From the insider's perspective, however, the choice is between nonban-
kruptcy liquidation with no personal liability, and bankruptcy reorgani-
zation with a personal liability of $10.250 In other words, the incentives
created by a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty may prevent efficient bank-
ruptcy filings.251
guaranties exists before any bankruptcy filing - the threat is that the bankruptcy case will never
be initiated.
247. See supra Part II.B.1.
248. See supra Part M.A.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 120-122.
250. One half of the $80 reorganization value, or $40, will be applied to the $50 in guarantied
debt.
251. Note that this same disincentive does not exist when the insider has entered into an
unconditional guaranty. The choice would then be between nonbankruptcy liquidation, which
would result in personal liability for a $15 deficiency ($50 owed to the guarantied creditor, less
$35 share of liquidation value), and a bankruptcy reorganization with personal liability of just $10
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Moreover, there is reason to be concerned that waivers of post-
default rights may be entered into even when they are not, ex ante, effi-
cient. Particularly where these waivers are used to signal creditworthi-
ness, as insider guaranties are, it is possible that borrowers will decline
to ask for efficient terms for fear of labeling themselves as unworthy
borrowers.25 2 While this risk exists with bankruptcy waivers and insider
guaranties in general, the problem is exacerbated in the case of springing
or exploding guaranties: At least in the case of an outright waiver 5 3 or
unconditional guaranty, the insider has efficient incentives regarding the
bankruptcy case. Thus, once the firm is in financial trouble the insider
can be expected to negotiate with the waiver holder to relinquish the
waiver for some reasonable quid pro quo.254 In the case of a springing
guaranty, however, the insider's conflict usually means that there is no
one in a position to act on behalf of the creditor body. Thus, the collec-
tive action problem is likely to cripple renegotiation. In this way, bank-
ruptcy-contingent guaranties are more inimical to the goals of
bankruptcy than a simple waiver of bankruptcy rights which the debtor
could seek to renegotiate without the in terrorem effect of the springing
liability.
If springing guaranties violate a fundamental bankruptcy policy -
preventing firms that would benefit from reorganization from filing and
defeating the Bankruptcy Code's ability to cure the collective action
problem faced by creditors - there is still the question of what legal
doctrine, if any, a bankruptcy court could use to bar enforcement of the
contract. As shown above, it seems difficult to argue that the guaranty is
unenforceable under state law, and obligations that are binding under
state law are normally enforceable in bankruptcy.
However, a bankruptcy court could enjoin suit on a bankruptcy-
($50 guarantied debt less $40 share of the reorganized firm). Note as well that the provision at
issue in Prince George Corp. avoided the perverse incentives attendant on many springing
guaranties, because it imposed deficiency liability only "to the extent" that prohibited acts
impaired the FDIC's recourse to its collateral. F.D.I.C. v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 104, 104
(4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the damages were measured by the interest lost and expenses incurred
directly from the borrower's acts. This is dramatically different - and far more defensible - in
its effects from a provision that would make the borrower's principals liable for the entire
deficiency, regardless of the actual harm caused by the borrower's resistance.
252. See Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of
Redemption, 52 VAD. L. REv. 599, 636-41 (1999).
253. Although I have argued for the enforceability of bankruptcy waivers, I am not optimistic
that courts will adopt this position. See Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 152.
Accordingly, throughout this analysis I assume that waivers of the right to file for bankruptcy are
void on "public policy" grounds. Nonetheless, even if courts determine that bankruptcy waivers
are enforceable, for the reasons expressed in this paragraph I believe that springing and exploding
guaranties are suspect.
254. See Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 152, at 330.
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contingent guaranty using its general equitable powers under section
105.255 These powers are limited to actions "necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of' the Bankruptcy Code, so injunctive relief of
this sort is not possible except insofar as it is in aid of other specific
bankruptcy provisions.2 56 Equitable relief is consistent with the policies
and provisions of the Code in these cases. For example, section 362 of
the Code, the automatic stay, enjoins creditor actions against the debtor
or its property, but does not enjoin suits against third parties. 257 None-
theless, courts have repeatedly entered temporary injunctions protecting
third parties (such as insider guarantors) to carry out the intent of the
automatic stay.258 Similarly, section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
generally invalidates provisions that grant rights against the debtor upon
the filing of bankruptcy, generally called "ipso facto clauses. 259 This
provision applies only to "an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor," and thus would not invalidate a bankruptcy-contingent guar-
anty.26° However, where a contract against a third party has the effect of
creating additional leverage over the debtor upon the filing of the bank-
ruptcy case, as a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty does, such a contract
would seem to fall within the intended functions of section 365(e).
In short, bankruptcy courts should be willing to invoke their author-
ity under section 105 to further the policies effectuated by sections 362
and 365(e)(1) by temporarily enjoining suits on bankruptcy-contingent
guaranties. The reasoning is consistent with, but more persuasive than,
other cases in which bankruptcy courts have granted temporary injunc-
255. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides, in relevant part: "The court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
256. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (stating that
authority under section 105 is limited because "whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code").
257. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1988).
258. It generally has been held that bankruptcy courts do have the power to temporarily enjoin
suits against third parties, such as guarantors, where the injunction is necessary to facilitate the
reorganization. Cases in which such injunctions have been granted to protect insider guarantors
include: In re Third Eighty-Ninth Assocs., 138 B.R. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Litchfield Co. of S.C.
L.P. v. Anchor Bank (In re Litchfield Co. of S.C. Ltd. Partnership), 135 B.R. 797 (W.D.N.C.
1992); In re Lomas Fin Corp., 117 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of
Little Rock v. Pettit, 12 B.R. 147 (E.D. Ark. 1981); In re F.T.L., Inc., 152 B.R. 61 (Bankr.
E.D.Va. 1993); Codfish Corp. v. FDIC (In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1988):
In re Kasual Kreations, 54 B.R. 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Northlake Bldg Partners, 41
B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984). For discussions of the temporary injunction issue, see Paul H.
Deutch, Note, Expanding the Automatic Stay: Protecting Nondebtors in Single Asset Bankruptcy
Cases, 2 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 453 (1994); G.H. Ishii-Chang, Litigation and Bankruptcy: The
Dilemma of the Codefendant Stay, 63 Am. BANKR. L.J. 257 (1989); Elizabeth H. Winchester,
Note, Expanding the Bankruptcy Code: The Use of Section 362 and Section 105 to Protect Solvent
Executives of Debtor Corporations, 58 BROOKLYN L. REv. 929 (1992); Zaretsky, supra note 105.
259. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1986).
260. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1986).
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tions against the enforcement of insider guaranties on grounds that such
suits threatened the bankruptcy proceedings.2 6  The argument is more
persuasive because of the inappropriate incentives created by the bank-
ruptcy-contingent nature of the liability.
A more difficult question will arise when the court must consider
whether to permit the bankruptcy-contingent liability to be discharged
pursuant to a bankruptcy plan.2 62 Assuming that such injunctions are
not barred by section 524(e), a matter on which courts are split,2 63
261. See supra cases cited at note 258.
262. A more difficult question is whether a permanent injunction should be granted if the
bankruptcy of the borrower does not result in a confirmed plan of reorganization. If the
bankruptcy case is converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed, that is a strong indication that the filing
was inefficient, and it does not seem to threaten - and indeed may support - bankruptcy policy to
enforce personal liability triggered by the inappropriate recourse to bankruptcy. This is consistent
with the decisions in Prince George and Brookhaven. See supra notes 217, 225. If bankruptcy
waivers were enforceable, then an absolute bar on bankruptcy-contingent liability would make
sense. If bankruptcy waivers are not enforceable, the costs of disabling this second-best option
may be significant.
Yet, conversion or dismissal does not prove the case should not have been filed or even that
the case did not benefit creditors. Moreover, given the uncertainty of any bankruptcy case, the
risk of such liability would deter some efficient cases. The distorted incentive created by the
bankruptcy-contingent liability, see supra text accompanying notes 249 to 251, argues for their
outright prohibition, and so relief should be available to the guarantor even absent confirmation of
a reorganization plan. The appropriate limitation on release of a bankruptcy-contingent liability
should not be whether or not a plan is confirmed, but whether the case was filed in good faith.
Courts have properly held that a bankruptcy case filed simply in order to protect guarantors is
filed in bad faith. See, e.g., In re Humble Place Joint Venture, 836 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1991); In re
North Vermont Associates, L.P., 165 B.R. 340 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994). Again, this appears largely
consistent with Prince George and Brookhaven, situations in which the bankruptcy cases were
quickly dismissed. See supra notes 217, 225. It seems appropriate for state courts to leave
discharge of the liability up to the bankruptcy court, which is in a much better position to
determine whether the petition was filed in good faith.
263. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have rejected the authority of the bankruptcy courts to
permanently enjoin actions against third parties (effectively discharging the third parties'
obligations), relying largely on section 524(e), which provides: "Except as provided in subsection
(a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1999). See
Resorts Int'l v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995); American
Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th
Cir. 1989); Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Landsing Diversified
Properties-Il v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Western Real Estate Fund), 922 F.2d 592, 601-
02 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that section 524(e) prohibits discharge of third party). Most courts
and commentators disagree. See, e.g., Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir.
1995) (bankruptcy court has "related to" jurisdiction over creditors' suits against debtor's insurer,
but lacks power to permanently enjoin such suits); In re Specialty Equip. Inc. 3 F.3d 1043 (7th
Cir. 1993) (stating, in dicta, that while section 524(e) provides that the discharge does not release
third parties, it "does not purport to limit or restrain the power of the bankruptcy court to
otherwise grant a release to a third party."); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In bankruptcy cases, a
court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, provided the injunction plays an important
part in the debtor's reorganization plan." (citing A.H. Robins)); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988); Menard Sanford v. Mabey (In re
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should a permanent injunction be permitted over the objection of a cred-
itor holding a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty? Even in those courts
that permit them, permanent injunctions protecting third parties are
viewed as extraordinary relief requiring unusually powerful justifica-
tions.264 However, a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty is not, at its core,
an obligation of a third party or a contract of financial assurance; it is a
bonding device used to control the business decisions of the debtor, with
financial liability imposed on the principals as a penalty for breach.265
As such, it is appropriate for a bankruptcy court to enjoin enforcement
as part of a reorganization plan.
Although the springing guaranties were enforced in Prince George
and Brookhaven Realty, these cases are consistent with the arguments
advanced here. In each case, the debtor had no real prospect of reorga-
nizing and the bankruptcy case had been quickly dismissed prior to the
A.H. Robins Co., Inc.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); In re
AOV Indus., Inc. 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray (In re
Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31 (D. Mass. 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re
Heron, Burchette, Ruckert and Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992); see generally
Hydee Feldstein, Reinterpreting Bankruptcy Code §524(e), 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 25 (1994); Peter E.
Meltzer, Getting Out of Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be Used to Release
Nondebtor Parties?, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that section 105 does not authorize
bankruptcy courts to enjoin actions against third parties).
Even if such permanent injunctions are within the power of the bankruptcy court, this power
is seldom if ever used to protect guarantors. Cases decline to confirm reorganization plans on the
grounds that they impermissibly purport to release the liability of third party guarantors or
codebtors. See American Hardwoods Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp, (In re American Hardwoods),
885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. BAP
1990); In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Bennett
Paper Corp., 65 B.R. 518 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986); Bill Roderick Distrib. Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co.
(In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756 (D. Utah 1985). In the only case I have been able to find in
which the bankruptcy court may (the published appellate decision is unclear) have confirmed such
a plan over the timely objection of a creditor, the order was reversed on appeal. See Mellon Bank
v. M.K. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
For analysis of the propriety of permanently enjoining actions against third parties, see Ralph
Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor
Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 959; Meltzer, supra; Feldstein,
supra; Kenneth M. Lewis, When are Nondebtors Really Entitled to a Discharge: Setting the
Record Straight on Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins, 3 J. Br.aN . L. & Prec. 163 (1994); Judith
R. Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor Claim in Corporate
Reorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 485 (1993); Howard C. Buschmann In & Sean P. Madden,
The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47
Bus. LAW. 913 (1992).
264. Such injunctions have been permitted primarily when the injunction was necessary to the
reorganization. In those cases, the creditor(s) being enjoined were to receive payment in full
under the plan of reorganization, and the vast majority of creditor(s) being enjoined consented to
the injunction. See In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994)
(gathering and discussing cases).
265. I use the word "penalty" carefully here to distinguish from "damages." The principal
objection to the bankruptcy-contingent guaranty is that the liability is not measured by the loss
occasioned by the bankruptcy filing itself.
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state law suit seeking to impose personal liability. As the court noted in
Brookhaven Realty, "The policies of providing a debtor with a fresh start
and an opportunity to reorganize its finances are not present in a foreclo-
sure proceeding." '266
It remains to be seen whether, given a viable debtor, bankruptcy-
contingent liability would be found invalid on "public policy" grounds
or as an unenforceable penalty. Moreover, we have not yet seen a case
where a bankruptcy court, rather than a state court, has been asked to
rule on the enforceability of a springing guaranty or to grant an injunc-
tion barring its enforcement in order to protect the bankruptcy
proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
The treatment of insider guaranties is not a minor technical ques-
tion. It is one that has significant ramifications for the overall function-
ing of bankruptcy law for many small businesses. In a recent article on
the interactions of corporate and bankruptcy law, Professor David Skeel
observed that the forms of managerial control used during the healthy
life of a business organization are inherently linked to the type of bank-
ruptcy system available to that entity.267 The U.S. system of corporate
law can be characterized as one of ex post controls.268 While countries
like Japan and Germany have a system of close monitoring by share-
holder/creditors (ex ante controls on management),269 the U.S. system
combines dispersed shareholding with the threat of takeover (and the
replacement of management) if a firm is poorly managed.27° Yet take-
overs involve high leverage, and the potential threat of a takeover may
induce a firm to borrow heavily. 271 The ex post form of governance
therefore increases the risk of bankruptcy for firms that have going con-
cern value and should not be liquidated.272 Given that this form of cor-
porate control involves a high risk of financial distress, it makes sense
that it should be paired with a bankruptcy system that keeps manage-
ment in place and is generous in its efforts to preserve going concern
value - a system like Chapter 11.273
This description of the U.S. system of corporate governance, how-
ever, is accurate only insofar as we are discussing public companies. It
266. 637 N.Y.S. 2d 418, 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
267. See Skeel, Evolutionary Theory, supra note 24.
268. See id. at 1339-46.
269. See id. at 1337-39, 1343-46.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 1339-40.
272. See id. at 1340.
273. See id. at 1340-43.
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must be modified in important respects to deal with small business,
where ownership is concentrated and closely tied to management and the
divide between personal assets and business assets is porous. Takeovers
are not a means of disciplining small business managers, who control the
stock of their companies, nor is firing a credible threat when the busi-
ness depends on the personal knowledge and abilities of the manager. It
may also be too costly for creditors to monitor small businesses, keeping
a steady watch for signs of impending trouble.274 Thus, creditors turn to
a more cost-effective means of monitoring and policing the firm: the
insider guaranty. Supervision by the insider guarantor is less expensive
than monitoring by creditors, and will be superior to monitoring by an
insider not subject to a guaranty because the insider-guarantor is a
residual claimhholder in a way that a simple equity holder is not.275
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code brought small and large businesses
under a common bankruptcy framework.2 7 6 However, the different
mechanisms of monitoring and policing large firms versus small firms
call for divergent bankruptcy regimes.277 The forgiving, reorganization-
focused, management-led bankruptcy system necessitated by our system
of ex post controls over public corporations is simply inappropriate for
small businesses, where the dominant means of monitoring and policing
misbehavior is ex ante, through leverage over insiders.
If the bankruptcy and corporate law systems are inherently inter-
twined and complementary, it seems unlikely that a single bankruptcy
framework would be appropriate for large and small firms. We should
expect legislative, judicial, and/or market adjustments to distinguish the
274. See Mann, supra note 9, at 19-22 (noting that small business lenders generally do not
monitor their borrowers).
275. If the firm's primary lender has a lien on all of the firm's assets, but is undersecured, then
that creditor is the residual claimholder. See, e.g., Skeel, Markets, Courts, supra note 70, at 512
n.170. The debtor in possession retains substantial decision making authority. The insider
guaranty is the mechanism for equating the interests of the two.
276. Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, there were three separate
chapters applicable to business reorganization. Chapter X was designed to handle cases involving
public companies, Chapter XI handled most other business cases, and Chapter XUI handled real
estate reorganization. On the merging of these three separate regimes into a single framework, see,
e.g., Hon. Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11: Does One Size Fit All, 4 AM. BANr, R. INST. L. REv. 167,
170-75 (1996); LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, supra note 77, at 745-49; Ralph A.
Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM.
BANKr. L.J. 65, 66-72 (1989).
277. See generally Skeel, Evolutionary Theory, supra note 24; see also Skeel, Markets, Courts,
supra note 70, at 510-520 (suggesting that closely held and publicly held firms be governed by
different bankruptcy regimes); LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, supra note 77 (arguing that
Chapter 11 may be appropriate for large firm bankruptcies, but not for small business cases). But
see Clark, supra note 276 (arguing that Chapter 11 may be an adequate structure for handling the
reorganization of diverse entities, but that its functioning could be improved through greater
training of bankruptcy judges).
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bankruptcy treatment of these divergent business forms. These types of
changes are actually taking place on the legislative and judicial fronts.
For example, much attention has been paid to the judicial development
of "fast track" bankruptcy for small business debtors, a system of close
judicial control intended to reduce the waste and delay endemic to small
business cases.278 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has
recommended extensive changes in the treatment of small business reor-
ganizations.279 Congress has also addressed the problem of small busi-
ness bankruptcy in recent years, rejecting a proposal to establish a new
"Chapter 10" to govern small business cases,28° but passing several
minor reforms intended to make small business cases more efficient.281
While attention is often focused on the legislative and judicial
developments, the bankruptcy system also changes through marketplace
adaptations which often go unnoted. There is evidence that the 1978
Code increased lenders' costs, which in turn raised the price of loans to
small businesses.282 It should be no surprise that lenders and borrowers
are responding by seeking to reduce the costs imposed by the bank-
ruptcy system. Today, we are witnessing the rise of "bankruptcy
278. See, e.g., Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction:
An Empirical Analysis, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85 (1996); Hon. A. Thomas Small, Small
Business Bankruptcy Cases, 1 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305 (1993); LoPucki, The Trouble with
Chapter 11, supra note 77, at 751-52.
279. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Vulnerability, Survival, and the Problem of Small Business
Bankruptcy, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 413 (1994) (advocating Congressional reform of small business
bankruptcy).
280. Explaining the impetus behind the proposal, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
stated:
Chapter 11 of the current Bankruptcy Code is required to handle both the corporate
reorganizations of a multimillion-dollar international company and that of a small,
rural grocery store. Trying to make these laws apply to vastly different corporate
enterprises has created problems and inefficiencies in the handling of individual
bankruptcy cases. As a result, this bill seeks to further experiment in the area of
business reorganizations by establishing a small business bankruptcy chapter. Such
a proposed pilot program balances the concerns of substantially rewriting the
Bankruptcy Code with the need for additional information to guide congressional
inquiry into problems faced by small businesses when they seek a bankruptcy
reorganization.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS BANKRurcY REFORM LEGISLATION, Before Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 279, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1992).
281. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-394, § 217, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994),
created a new definition for "small business" (now codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C)). The act
provided that if a debtor elects to be treated as a small business, the bankruptcy court need not
appoint a creditors' committee (11 U.S.C. § 1102(3)), tightened the provision for debtor's
exclusive right to file a plan (11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)). It also provided a streamlined process for
combining the hearings on approval of the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan (11
U.S.C. 1125(f)).
282. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Scott & Terence C. Smith, The Effect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 on Small Business Loan Pricing, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 119 (1986).
INSIDER GUARANTIES IN BANKRUPTCY
proofed" transactions, to name just one prominent example. 283 Insider
guaranties in general, and bankruptcy-contingent guaranties in particu-
lar, are marketplace innovations that respond to the changed cost/benefit
calculations resulting from the adoption of a reorganization-biased bank-
ruptcy system. As experience with the current Bankruptcy Code has
grown, the parties are adapting their contractual relationships to mini-
mize costs where it is a less-than-efficient device. 284 Thus, the rise of
springing guaranties - and the increasing use of insider guaranties -
may well be market adjustments intended to resegregate bankruptcy
options according to firm characteristics. Under the new contractual
regime, if it succeeds, bankruptcy reorganization would become less
available for closely-held borrowers with institutional debt, while
remaining available for public companies.
Bankruptcy courts, of course, have had to deal with insider guaran-
ties on an individual, rather than systemic, level. The prevailing para-
digm has been the guaranty as a contract of financial assurance, an
obligation of a third party largely outside the concern of the bankruptcy
court. This approach has had its merits: By abstracting away from the
interrelationship between insider guaranties and the financial agency
problems that they are really intended to address, the law has permitted
guaranties to remain largely unaffected by the bankruptcy of the bor-
rower. This provides contracting parties with a high level of certainty
about their rights.
The cost of this approach is that it ignores a large element of real-
ity. Insider guaranties are not simply contracts of financial support.
They are a crucial link in the managerial and financial structure of
closely-held firms, bonding devices used by lenders to exercise leverage
over issues that cannot easily be controlled through explicit covenants
written into a loan agreement. As such, a formalistic analysis, such as
the categorization of guaranties as obligations of a third party that do not
involve the debtor, is simply incorrect. Insider guaranties must be
addressed through the same agency cost framework that has been so
productively applied to other corporate, commercial, and bankruptcy law
subjects. When this is done, we can make more rigorous and reasoned
283. See, e.g., Gregory A. Tselikis, "Bankruptcy Proofing" Your Commercial Transactions:
Reality or Myth, 13 ME. BAR J. 234 (1998); Sheryl A. Gussett, Bankruptcy Remote Entities in
Structured Financings, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (March 1996); Richard M. Graf, Use of LLCs as
Bankruptcy-Proof Entities Widens, The Nat'l L.J., April 10, 1995, at B16.
284. I have been unable to locate data on insider guaranties for the full time horizon to
determine whether their use increased with the passage of the Bankruptcy Code. Other data does
seem to indicate that the use of insider guaranties increased between the late 1980s and early
1990s, a period when lenders were becoming increasingly aware of the costs imposed by the
Code. See Avery, supra note 98, at 1056-58.
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decisions regarding the way in which reorganization of a financially
troubled borrower should, or should not, be pernitted to affect the liabil-
ities of insiders on these instruments.
